A Critique of the Minimalist Program
A full critique of the minimalist program would be lengthy, owing to the com-
plexity of the theory. However, some discussion of key elements is possible.
Without question, the MP’s generalization of production rules and elimination
of deep structure offer a significant improvement over transformational-gener-
ative grammar. T-G grammar rules struck many working in linguistics and cog-
nitive science as being both too numerous and too complex to reflect actual
language production. In addition, a range of studies found no evidence that
meaning resided in the deep structure. By eliminating deep structure, the mini-
malist program overcomes the problem inherent in this T-G claim, as well as
the claim that surface structure was merely a manifestation of syntax. If nothing
else, common sense tells us that meaning permeates the entire language sys-
tem, and the MP allows for this.
The exploration of universal grammar represents a clear step forward in
linguistic analysis. Although the term may be misleading or even inappropri-
ate (as discussed previously), there is no question that the MP identifies an
important area for future research. Why do the world’s languages show so lit-
tle variation at the deepest level? Does the structure of language reveal opera-
tional limitations of the brain?
Other features of the minimalist program are a bit problematic. InSyntactic
Structures,Chomsky (1957) argued that the crucial problem for phrase-struc-
ture grammar was its lack of either descriptive or explanatory adequacy. That
is, phrase-structure grammar did not sufficiently describe or explain language.
T-G grammar, he claimed, was superior because it was descriptively and
explanatorily sound.
Time showed that these claims were inaccurate (see Harris, 1993). Accord-
ing to Chomsky (1995), the minimalist program eliminates the deficiencies of
T-G grammar. He noted, for example, that “A theory of UG [universal gram-
mar] is true if ... it correctly describes the initial state of the language faculty. In
that case it will provide a descriptively adequate grammar.... A true theory of
UG meets the condition ofexplanatory adequacy” (pp. 18–19). The problem,
of course, is that we have no way of ascertaining whether a theory of universal
grammar correctly describes the initial state of the language faculty—or even
whether thereisa language faculty as described in the MP. Moreover, the MP
focuses so much on explanation that it neglects description. Stated another
way, the MP aims narrowly to describe the cognitive operations related to lan-
guage production and summarily dismisses the “descriptive taxonomy” of lan-
guage. This taxonomy is not inconsequential, especially for teachers and others
who must work with the structure of language. In addition, the description of
NOAM CHOMSKY AND GRAMMAR 191