218 CHAPTER 6
ition may tell us that these sentences are related, but our language sense also
tells us that they have different meanings and emphases. At the very least,
Fredis the focus of the active form, whereasMacarenais the focus of the
passive. However, many readers/hearers would also note thatMacarena
seems to be a willing participant in the first sentence but an unwilling partic-
ipant in the second.
The Implications for Grammatical Analysis. This kind of analysis al-
lows us to understand why cognitive grammar maintains that the role of gram-
mar is merely to describe surface structures. As Langacker (1987) noted,
cognitive grammar “is defined as those aspects of cognitive organization in
which resides a speaker’s grasp of established linguistic conventions. It can be
characterized as a structured inventory of conventional linguistic units” (p. 57).
On this account, grammatical analyses focus on conventional linguistic knowl-
edge, that is, on the knowledge gained from experience with real language
rather than language manufactured to meet the needs of syntactic analysis. Be-
cause phrase-structure grammar is ideally suited for describing “conventional
linguistic units,” cognitive grammar relies on phrase structure for the symbolic
representation of syntax.
Using phrase-structure grammar for syntactic analysis raises the question of
phrase-structure rules, but those working in cognitive grammar do not recog-
nize the formulaic descriptions familiar from chapter 2 as being rules in any
meaningful sense. Langacker (1990), for example, referred to phrase-structure
rules as “general statements” (p. 102). Thus, there is no reason to assume that
the NP VP notation specifies a rule, but there is every reason to recognize that it
describes a grammatical relation.
Issues of meaning become self-evident because there is no effort to develop
an intervening stage between cognition and utterance. This position has the im-
mediate benefit of linking syntax and semantics, which Langacker (1987,
1990) supported when he cautioned against efforts to separate syntax and se-
mantics, arguing that in cognitive grammar “symbolic structure is not distinct
from semantic or phonological structure” (p. 105).
Chomsky’s (1957) charge that phrase-structure grammar fails to provide a
theory of language is viable only if one assumes that grammar should be theo-
retical. There is no compelling reason to make this assumption. Cognitive
grammar proceeds from a different assumption—that the first goal is to de-
velop a viable theory of cognition that will include language and grammar.
I would argue that cognitive grammar enables a deeper understanding of
what many teachers already know—the key to helping students become better
writers lies in getting them to become effective, self-motivated readers and in
giving them frequent opportunities to write. The feedback from peers and