16 Leaders The Economist November 20th 2021
I
n many westerncountries,politicians,soldiersandveterans
gather every November to pay tribute to comrades killed fight
ing for their country. Among those commemorated this year
were more than 3,500 troops from America and its allies who
died in Afghanistan before the West’s humiliating retreat this
summer. And among those paying tribute, far from the Ceno
taph in London or the Arc de Triomphe in Paris, were dusty West
ern soldiers in small garrisons across a swathe of Africa. With
the formalities over, they resumed their posts among almost
9,000 European and American troops on the front line of what is
now the West’s biggest offensive against jihadists, in the Sahel. It
is not going well (see Middle East & Africa section). How it will
end depends in no small part on whether the West learns the
right lessons from its failures in Afghanistan.
Some may argue that the main lesson is to
avoid fighting insurgents in distant lands
where no pressing national interests are at
stake. But that is not the case in the Sahel, where
jihadists aligned to alQaeda and Islamic State
have taken aim at Western countries, bombing
their embassies and kidnapping or killing their
citizens. If the jihadists are given havens and
time, they will surely launch attacks on European or American
soil, too. “That is their goal and their determination and they’ve
been open about it,” says a Western general.
Western governments see other interests at stake as well. The
most afflicted countries of the Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger)
are among the poorest, have the world’s fastestgrowing popula
tions and are among those where climate change will do the
greatest harm. It would not take much of a push by the insur
gents to make some of these fragile states crumble. Millions
could be displaced, many of whom would flee the ensuing hu
manitarian disaster northward, to Europe.
How to ward off calamity? Afghanistan underlines the need
for patience. The Economist opposed withdrawing from the
countrywhena smallforcecouldhavekept the Taliban at bay
without suffering many casualties. Western governments—and
in particular France, whose forces do most of the fighting—
should be clear that they are in for a long fight in the Sahel.
To try to build a full democracy against a ticking clock in Af
ghanistan was a fool’s errand. Doing so in the Sahel would take
decades, if it were doable at all. Hence, although the West should
offer more than a purely military solution, it should be realistic
about what it can achieve. A start would be to respond to local
grievances. Niger defeated a rebellion by its Tuareg minority in
the 1990s by pairing military action with talks and promises of
political representation and a share of state revenues. In Mali
more than 40 local peace deals have provided some relief from
relentless conflict. Outsiders must water these
rare green shoots of peace.
Afghanistan also showed that, even with
overwhelming military power, it is hard to de
feat an insurgency without also winning over
the local people. In the Sahel every demand for a
bribe, every massacre by militiamen or sol
diers, alienates civilians from Westernbacked
regimes and drives them towards the black flag
of jihad. But governments are loth to disarm militias or prose
cute abuses, for fear of provoking more coups. They should look
to Niger which has managed to discourage ethnic militias.
Though hard hit by a jihadist insurgency, it has thereby largely
avoided the spiral of communal violence that afflicts its neigh
bours. Farther afield, Uganda showed it is possible to hold
troops ruthlessly to account by sentencing two of its peacekeep
ers to death for killing civilians in Somalia.
Western governments must be honest with their own voters.
Unless they build support for a long war, the jihadists may sim
ply wait until the Frenchled operation grows weary. That would
be a recipe for the same ignominious defeatsuffered by the West
in Afghanistan. It need not happen again.n
To prevail against jihadists in the Sahel, the West must learn from past mistakes
The next Afghanistan
The war on terror in Africa
F
or mostof this century Chile was a stable and predictable
country, with steady economic growth and moderate polit
ics. Outsiders saw it as a success story and a model for Latin
America. But that stable Chile disappeared two years ago, in an
explosion of massive and sometimes violent protests. Discon
tent had built up and politicians seemed unable to deal with
slower growth and narrowing opportunities, especially for
younger people. A plan to hold a convention to write a new con
stitution calmed the protests and seemed to offer a peaceful sol
ution to the sort of grievances that have afflicted many countries
in recent years. But Chile has yet to recover its balance, as a po
larised presidential election on November 21st is likely to show.
In a vote for the constitutional convention in May (in which
only 43% turned out), support surged for the hard left while dry
ing up for mainstream parties. As a result, the convention has
become a theatre of wokeness, with calls to wage war against
pivotal industries such as mining (accounting for over half of ex
ports) and agriculture for export (more than 30%), alongside
more justified demands for a bigger role for the state in pen
sions, health care and green regulation. Optimists say a realistic,
modernising constitution can still emerge; pessimists fear a
Utopian list of unaffordable rights and anticapitalism.
Unless moderates rediscover their convictions, an extremist will become president
From role-model to cautionary tale
Chile