The Economist November 20th 2021 75
Finance & economics
Chinaandcommodities
Material clout
F
ew criseshighlight China’s weight in
commodity markets as clearly as the
global energy crunch. Though analysts at
tribute the shortages to many different
causes, all mention China. Its postcovid
economic recovery, coupled with a hot
summer, produced a surge in demand for
power. Supplies of its two main sources of
electricity, coal and hydropower, were
curbed by environmental crackdowns and
droughts respectively.
At first China tried to supplement pow
er generation with liquefied natural gas
(lng). Its imports of lng so far this year are
14% higher than in the same period last
year. That has caused prices to surge and
has had ripple effects around the world. As
lngcargoes have been rerouted east, for
instance, Europe has found itself short of
gas. Rising gas prices have only under
scored the importance of coal in China,
which already consumes 55% of the
world’s supply of the stuff. In October Chi
na imported nearly twice as much coal as it
had in the same month in 2020, causing
prices to boom. Even oil has risen on ex
pectations that China will burn that too, if
necessary, to keep its electricity plants
running. As usual in commodity markets,
other factors are also at play. But China still
shakes the world.
China’s heft is partly the result of its
size. As a huge consumer and, in some cas
es, producer of materials, it can disrupt
global markets even with modest tweaks to
policy. Its clout is growing on the financial
side of commodity trading too, thanks to
China’s three big futures exchanges; inter
national traders say that you cannot be
successful without dealing on them. Now
China wants to extend its influence over
commodities further still. Officials are
aiming to turn the proliferation of local
contracts, for instance, into international
price standards.
The rule of thumb for commodity trad
ers is that China consumes “half of every
thing”. For some materials, such as iron
ore, even this is an understatement (see
chart 1 on next page). China’s big appetite
alone gives it influence in markets. But it
also means that the authorities deem ma
ny commodities strategically important.
And they are not shy about intervening.
Take maize. A glut in China in 201015
pushed government inventories up to un
precedented levels and led the authorities
to reduce financial incentives to corn
farmers. But the resulting fall in output
was too sharp, forcing China to look over
seas to replenish stocks. Corn imports
jumped from less than 5m tonnes a year in
201318 to almost 30m tonnes in 2020. Part
ly as a consequence, American corn prices
doubled over the first half of last year.
China’s strategies also involve boosting
supply to keep prices low. In order to keep a
lid on infrastructure costs in the 2000s, it
invested in a huge number of aluminium
smelters and encouraged producers to
raise output. Graeme Train of Trafigura, a
trading firm, estimates that the smelters
cost around $70bn. But without them, the
price of aluminium would probably have
The world’s biggest consumer of raw materials wants to extend its influence
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