Before philosophy began, the Greeks had a theory or feeling about the universe, which may be
called religious or ethical. According to this theory, every person and every thing has his or its
appointed place and appointed function. This does not depend upon the fiat of Zeus, for Zeus
himself is subject to the same kind of law as governs others. The theory is connected with the idea
of fate or necessity. It applies emphatically to the heavenly bodies. But where there is vigour, there
is a tendency to overstep just bounds; hence arises strife. Some kind of impersonal super-
Olympian law punishes hubris, and restores the eternal order which the aggressor sought to
violate. This whole outlook, originally, perhaps, scarcely conscious, passed over into philosophy;
it is to be found alike in cosmologies of strife, such as those of Heraclitus and Empedocles, and in
monistic doctrines such as that of Parmenides. It is the source of the belief both in natural and in
human law, and it clearly underlies Plato's conception of justice.
The word "justice," as still used in the law, is more similar to Plato's conception than it is as used
in political speculation. Under the influence of democratic theory, we have come to associate
justice with equality, while for Plato it has no such implication. "Justice," in the sense in which it
is almost synonymous with "law"--as when we speak of "courts of justice"--is concerned mainly
with property rights, which have nothing to do with equality. The first suggested definition of
"justice," at the beginning of the Republic, is that it consists in paying debts. This definition is
soon abandoned as inadequate, but something of it remains at the end.
There are several points to be noted about Plato's definition. First, it makes it possible to have
inequalities of power and privilege without injustice. The guardians are to have all the power,
because they are the wisest members of the community; injustice would only occur, on Plato's
definition, if there were men in the other classes who were wiser than some of the guardians. That
is why Plato provides for promotion and degradation of citizens, although he thinks that the
double advantage of birth and education will, in most cases, make the children of guardians
superior to the children of others. If there were a more exact science of government, and more
certainty of men following its precepts, there would be much to be said for Plato's system. No one
thinks it unjust to put the best men into a