amiably discussing justice with an old man named Cephalus, and with Plato's elder brothers
Glancon and Adeimanms, Thrasymachus, who has been listening with growing impatience, breaks
in with a vehement protest against such childish nonsense. He proclaims emphatically that "justice
is nothing else than the interest of the stronger."
This point of view is refuted by Socrates with quibbles; it is never fairly faced. It raises the
fundamental question in ethics and politics, namely: Is there any standard of "good" and "bad,"
except what the man using these words desires? If there is not, many of the consequences drawn
by Thrasymachus seem unescapable. Yet how are we to say that there is?
At this point, religion has, at first sight, a simple answer. God determines what is good and what
bad; the man whose will is in harmony with the will of God is a good man. Yet this answer is not
quite orthodox. Theologians say that God is good, and this implies that there is a standard of
goodness which is independent of God's will. We are thus forced to face the question: Is there
objective truth or falsehood in such a statement as "pleasure is good," in the same sense as in such
a statement as "snow is white"?
To answer this question, a very long discussion would be necessary. Some may think that we can,
for practical purposes, evade the fundamental issue, and say: "I do not know what is meant by
'objective truth,' but I shall consider a statement 'true' if all, or virtually all, of those who have
investigated it are agreed in upholding it." In this sense, it is "true" that snow is white, that Caesar
was assassinated, that water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen, and so on. We are then faced
with a question of fact: are there any similarly agreed statements in ethics? If there are, they can be
made the basis both for rules of private conduct, and for a theory of politics. If there are not, we
are driven in practice, whatever may be the philosophic truth, to a contest by force or propaganda
or both, whenever an irreconcilable ethical difference exists between powerful groups.
For Plato, this question does not really exist. Although his dramatic sense leads him to state the
position of Thrasymachns forcibly, he is quite unaware of its strength, and allows himself to be
grossly unfair in arguing against it. Plato is convinced that there is "the Good," and that its nature
can be ascertained; when people disagree