countenance such unorthodox theories as are to be found in the Republic concerning property and
the family. Those who neither fall below nor rise above the level of decent, well-behaved citizens
will find in the Ethics a systematic account of the principles by which they hold that their conduct
shold be regulated. Those who demand anything more will be disappointed. The book appeals to
the respectable middle-aged, and has been used by them, especially since the seveteenth century,
to repress the ardours and enthusiasms of the young. But to a man with any depth of feeling it
cannot but be repulsive.
The good, we are told, is happiness, which is an activity of the soul. Aristotle says that Plato was
right in dividing the soul into tow parts, one rational, the other irrational. The irrational part itself
he divides into the vegetative (which is found even in plants) and the appetitive (which is found in
all animals). the appetitive part may be in some degree rational, when the goods that it seeks are
such as reason approves of. This is essential to the account of virtue, for reason alone, in Aristotle,
is purely contemplative, and does not, without the help of appetite, lead to any practical activity.
There are tow kinds of virtues, intellectual and moral, corresponding to the two parts of the soul.
Intellectual virtues result from teaching, moral virtues from habit. It is the business of the
legislator to make the citizens good by forming good habits. We become just by performing just
acts, and similarly as regards other virtues. By being compelled to acquire good habits, we shall in
time, Aristotle thinks, come to find pleasure in performing good actions. One is reminded of
Hamlet's speech to his mother:
Assume a virtue if you have it not. That monster, custom, who all sense doth eat, Of habits devil,
is angel, yet in this, That to the use of actions fair and good He likewise gives a frock or livery
That aptly is put on.
We now come to the famous doctrine of the golden mean. Every virtue is a mean between two
extremes, each of which is a vice. This is proved by an examination of the various virtues.
Courage is a mean between cowardice and rashness; liberality, between prodigality and