friendship is only possible between the good, and it is impossible to be friends with many people.
One should not be friends with a person of higher station than one's own, unless he is also of
higher virtue, which will justify the respect shown to him. We have seen that, in unequal relations,
such as those of man and wife or father or son, the superior should be the more loved. It is
impossible to be friends with God, because He cannot love us. Aristotle discusses whether a man
can be a friend to himself, and decides that this is only possible if he is a good man; wicked men,
he asserts, often hate themselves. The good man should love himself, but nobly (1169a). Friends
are a comfort in misfortune, but one should not make them unhappy by seeking their sympathy, as
is done by women and womanish men (1171b). It is not only in misfortune that friends are
desirable, for the happy man needs friends with whom to share his happiness. "No one would
choose the whole world on condition of being alone, since man is a political creature and one
whose nature is to live with others" (1169b). All that is said about friendship is sensible, but there
is not a word that rises above common sense.
Aristotle again shows his good sense in the discussion of pleasure, which Plato had regarded
somewhat ascetically. Pleasure, as Aristotle uses the word, is distinct from happiness, though
there can be no happiness without pleasure. There are, he says, three views of pleasure: (1) that it
is never good; (2) that some pleasure is good, but most is bad; (3) that pleasure is good, but not
the best. He rejects the first of these on the ground that pain is certainly bad, and therefore
pleasure must be good. He says, very justly, that it is nonsense to say a man can be happy on the
rack: some degree of external good fortune is necessary for happiness. He also disposes of the
view that all pleasures are bodily; all things have something divine, and therefore some capacity
for higher pleasures. Good men have pleasure unless they are unfortunate, and God always enjoys
a single and simple pleasure. (1152-4).
There is another discussion of pleasure, in a later part of the book, which is not wholly consistent
with the above. Here it is argued that there are bad pleasures, which, however, are not pleasures to
good people (1173b); that perhaps differ in kind (1b); and that pleasures are good or bad
according as they are connected with good or bad activities (1175b). There are things that are
valued more