questions that we can ask about the ethics of Aristotle, or of any other philosopher: (1) Is it
internally self-consistent? (2) Is it consistent with the remainder of the author's views? (3) Does it
give answers to ethical problems that are consonant to our own ethical feelings? If the answer to
either the first or second question is in the negative, the philosopher in question has been guilty of
some intellectual error. But if the answer to the third question is in the negative, we have no right
to say that he is mistaken; we have only the right to say that we do not like him.
Let us examine these three questions in turn, as regards the ethical theory set forth in the
Nicomachean Ethics.
(1) On the whole, the book is self-consistent, except in a few not very important respects. The
doctrine that the good is happiness, and that happiness consists in successful activity, is well
worked out. The doctrine that every virtue is a mean between two extremes, though very
ingeniously developed, is less successful, since it does not apply to intellectual contemplation,
which, we are told, is the best of all activities. It can, however, be maintained that the doctrine of
the mean is only intended to apply to the practical virtues, not to those of the intellect. Perhaps, to
take another point, the position of the legislator is somewhat ambiguous. He is to cause children
and young people to acquire the habit of performing good actions, which will, in the end, lead
them to find pleasure in virtue, and to act virtuously without the need of legal compulsion. It is
obvious that the legislator might equally well cause the young to acquire bad habits; if this is to be
avoided, he must have all the wisdom of a Platonic guardian; and if it is not avoided, the argument
that a virtuous life is pleasant will fail. This problem, however, belongs perhaps more to politics
than to ethics.
(2) Aristotle's ethics is, at all points, consistent with his metaphysics. Indeed, his metaphysical
theories are themselves the expression of an ethical optimism. He believes in the scientific
importance of final causes, and this implies the belief that purpose governs the course of
development in the universe. He thinks that changes are, in the main, such as embody an increase
of organization or "form," and at bottom virtuous actions are those that favour this tendency. It is
true that a great deal of his practical ethics is not particularly philosophical, but merely the result
of observation of human affairs;