but this part of his doctrine, though it may be independent of his metaphysics, is not inconsistent
with it.
(3) When we come to compare Aristotle's ethical tastes with our own, we find, in the first place,
as already noted, an acceptance of inequality which is repugnant to much modern sentiment. Not
only is there no objection to slavery, or to the superiority of husbands and fathers over wives and
children, but it is held that what is best is essentially only for the few--proud men and
philosophers. Most men, it would seem to follow, are mainly means for the production of a few
rulers and sages. Kant maintained that every human being is an end in himself, and this may be
taken as an expression of the view introduced by Christianity. There is, however, a logical
difficulty in Kant's view, since it gives no means of reaching a decision when two men's interests
clash. If each is an end in himself, how are we to arrive at a principle for determining which shall
give way? Such a principle must have to do with the community rather than with the individual. In
the broadest sense of the word, it will have to be a principle of "justice." Bentham and the
utilitarians interpret "justice" as "equality": when two men's interests clash, the right course is that
which produces the greatest total of happiness, regardless of which of the two enjoys it, or how it
is shared among them. If more is given to the better man than to the worse, that is because, in the
long run, the general happiness is increased by rewarding virtue and punishing vice, not because
of an ultimate ethical doctrine that the good deserve more than the bad. "Justice," in this view,
consists in considering only the amount of happiness involved, without favour to one individual or
class as against another. Greek philosophers, including Plato and Aristotle, had a different
conception of justice, and it is one which is still widely prevalent. They thought-originally on
grounds derived from religion--that each thing or person had its or his proper sphere, to overstep
which is "unjust." Some men, in virtue of their character and aptitudes, have a wider sphere than
others, and there is no injustice if they enjoy a greater share of happiness. This view is taken for
granted in Aristotle, but its basis in primitive religion, which is evident in the earliest
philosophers, is no longer apparent in his writings.
There is in Aristotle an almost complete absence of what may be called benevolence or
philanthropy. The sufferings of mankind, in so