ophers, especially those to whom he might be considered indebted. "I suppose," he says, "that
these grumblers will believe me to be a disciple of The Mollusc (Nausiphanes) and to have
listened to his teaching in company with a few bibulous youths. For indeed the fellow was a bad
man and his habits such as could never lead to wisdom." * He never acknowledged the extent of
his indebtedness to Democritus, and as for Leucippus, he asserted that there was no such
philosopher-meaning, no doubt, not that there was no such man, but that the man was not a
philosopher. Diogenes Laertius gives a whole list of abusive epithets that he is supposed to have
applied to the most eminent of his predecessors. With this lack of generosity towards other
philosophers goes another grave fault, that of dictatorial dogmatism. His followers had to learn
a kind of creed embodying his doctrines, which they were not allowed to question. To the end,
none of them added or modified anything. When Lucretius, two hundred years later, turned the
philosophy of Epicurus into poetry, he added, so far as can be judged, nothing theoretical to the
master's teaching. Wherever comparison is possible, Lucretius is found to agree closely with the
original, and it is generally held that, elsewhere, he may be used to fill in the gaps in our
knowledge caused by the loss of all of Epicurus's three hundred books. Of his writings, nothing
remains except a few letters, some fragments, and a statement of "Principal Doctrines."
The philosophy of Epicurus, like all those of his age (with the partial exception of Scepticism),
was primarily designed to secure tranquillity. He considered pleasure to be the good, and
adhered, with remarkable consistency, to all the consequences of this view. "Pleasure," he said,
"is the beginning and end of the blesséd life." Diogenes Laertius quotes him as saying, in a
book on The End of Life, "I know not how I can conceive the good, if I withdraw the pleasures
of taste and withdraw the pleasures of love and those of hearing and sight." Again: "The
beginning and the root of all good is the pleasure of the stomach; even wisdom and culture must
be referred to this." The pleasure of the mind, we are told, is the contemplation of pleasures of
the body. Its only advantage over bodily pleasures is that we can learn to contemplate pleasure
rather than pain, and thus have
* The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers, by W. J. Oates, p. 47. Where possible, I have
availed myself of Mr. Oates's translations.