ment from design. This argument contends that, on a survey of the known world, we find things
which cannot plausibly be explained as the product of blind natural forces, but are much more
reasonably to be regarded as evidences of a beneficent purpose.
This argument has no formal logical defect; its premisses are empirical, and its conclusion
professes to be reached in accordance with the usual canons of empirical inference. The question
whether it is to be accepted or not turns, therefore, not on general metaphysical questions, but on
comparatively detailed considerations. There is one important difference between this argument
and the others, namely, that the God whom (if valid) it demonstrates need not have all the usual
metaphysical attributes. He need not be omnipotent or omniscient; He may be only vastly wiser
and more powerful than we are. The evils in the world may be due to His limited power. Some
modern theologians have made use of these possibilities in forming their conception of God. But
such speculations are remote from the philosophy of Leibniz, to which we must now return.
One of the most characteristic features of that philosophy is the doctrine of many possible worlds.
A world is "possible" if it does not contradict the laws of logic. There are an infinite number of
possible worlds, all of which God contemplated before creating the actual world. Being good, God
decided to create the best of the possible worlds, and He considered that one to be the best which
had the greatest excess of good over evil. He could have created a world containing no evil, but it
would not have been so good as the actual world. That is because some great goods are logically
bound up with certain evils. To take a trivial illustration, a drink of cold water when you are very
thirsty on a hot day may give you such great pleasure that you think the previous thirst, though
painful, was worth enduring, because without it the subsequent enjoyment could not have been so
great. For theology, it is not such illustrations that are important, but the connection of sin with
free will. Free will is a great good, but it was logically impossible for God to bestow free will and
at the same time decree that there should be no sin. God therefore decided to make man free,
although he foresaw that Adam would eat the apple, and although sin inevitably brought
punishment. The world that resulted, although it contains evil, has a greater surplus of good over
evil than any other possible world; it is therefore the best of all