characteristic of liberalism, and long survived the theological foundation that it had in Locke.
Locke states that liberty depends upon the necessity of pursuing true happiness and upon the
government of our passions. This opinion he derives from his doctrine that private and public
interests are identical in the long run, though not necessarily over short periods. It follows from
this doctrine that, given a community of citizens who are all both pious and prudent, they will all
act, given liberty, in a manner to promote the general good. There will be no need of human laws
to restrain them, since divine laws will suffice. The hitherto virtuous man who is tempted to
become a highwayman will say to himself: "I might escape the human magistrate, but I could not
escape punishment at the hands of the Divine Magistrate." He will accordingly renounce his
nefarious schemes, and live as virtuously as if he were sure of being caught by the police. Legal
liberty, therefore, is only completely possible where both prudence and piety are universal;
elsewhere, the restraints imposed by the criminal law are indispensable.
Locke.states repeatedly that morality is capable of demonstration, but he does not develop this
idea so fully as could be wished. The most important passage is:
"Morality capable of demonstration. The idea of a Supreme Being, infinite in power, goodness,
and wisdom, whose workmanship we are, and on whom we depend; and the idea of ourselves, as
understanding, rational beings, being such as are clear in us, would, I suppose, if duly considered
and pursued, afford such foundations of our duty and rules of action as might place morality
among the sciences capable of demonstration: wherein I doubt not, but from selfevident
propositions, by necessary consequences, as incontestable as those in mathematics, the measures
of right and wrong might be made out, to any one that will apply himself with the same
indifference and attention to the one as he does to the other of these sciences. The relation of other
modes may certainly be perceived, as well as those of number and extension: and I cannot see why
they should not also be capable of demonstration, if due methods were thought on to examine or
pursue their agreement or disagreement. 'Where there is no property, there is no injustice,' is a
proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid: for the idea of property