no transition to it from his individualistic premisses, except the mythical social contract.
The social contract, in the sense required, is mythical even when, at some former period, there
actually was a contract creating the government in question. The United States is a case in point.
At the time when the Constitution was adopted, men had liberty of choice. Even then, many voted
against it, and were therefore not parties to the contract. They could, of course, have left the
country, and by remaining were deemed to have become bound by a contract to which they had
not assented. But in practice it is usually difficult to leave one's country. And in the case of men
born after the adoption of the Constitution their consent is even more shadowy.
The question of the rights of the individual as against the government is a very difficult one. It is
too readily assumed by democrats that, when the government represents the majority, it has a right
to coerce the minority. Up to a point, this must be true, since coercion is of the essence of
government. But the divine right of majorities, if pressed too far, may become almost as tyrannical
as the divine right of kings. Locke says little on this subject in his Essays on Government, but
considers it at some length in his Letters on Toleration, where he argues that no believer in God
should be penalized on account of his religious opinions.
The theory that government was created by a contract is, of course, pre-evolutionary. Government,
like measles and whooping-cough, must have grown up gradually, though, like them, it could be
introduced suddenly into new regions such as the South Sea Islands. Before men had studied
anthropology they had no idea of the psychological mechanisms involved in the beginnings of
government, or of the fantastic reasons which lead men to adopt institutions and customs that
subsequently prove useful. But as a legal fiction, to justify government, the theory of the social
contract has some measure of truth.
D. PROPERTYFrom what has been said hitherto about Locke's views on property, it might seem as though he
were the champion of the great capitalists against both their social superiors and their social
inferiors, but this would be only a half-truth. One finds in him, side by side and unrecon-