It will be seen that, according to the above definitions, a mind and a piece of matter are, each of
them, a group of events. There is no reason why every event should belong to a group of one kind
or the other, and there is no reason why some events should not belong to both groups; therefore
some events may be neither mental nor material, and other events may be both. As to this, only
detailed empirical considerations can decide.
CHAPTER XVII HumeDAVID HUME ( 1711-76) is one of the most important among philosophers, because he
developed to its logical conclusion the empirical philosophy of Locke and Berkeley, and by
making it self-consistent made it incredible. He represents, in a certain sense, a dead end: in his
direction, it is impossible to go further. To refute him has been, ever since he wrote, a favourite
pastime among metaphysicians. For my part, I find none of their refutations convincing;
nevertheless, I cannot but hope that something less sceptical than Hume's system may be
discoverable.
His chief philosophical work, the Treatise of Human Nature, was written while he was living in
France during the years 1734 to 1737. The first two volumes were published in 1739, the third in
- He was a very young man, not yet in his thirties; he was not well known, and his
conclusions were such as almost all schools would find unwelcome. He hoped for vehement
attacks, which he would meet with brilliant retorts. Instead, no one noticed the book; as he says
himself, "it fell dead-born from the press." "But," he adds, "being naturally of a cheerful and
sanguine temper, I very soon recovered from the blow." He devoted himself to the writing of
essays, of which he produced the first volume in 1741. In 1744 he made an unsuccessful attempt
to obtain a professorship at Edinburgh; having failed in this, he became first tutor to a lunatic and
then secretary to a general.