tion. He holds that the happiness of common people is no part of the good per se. All that is good
or bad in itself exists only in the superior few; what happens to the rest is of no account.
The next question is: How are the superior few defined? In practice, they have usually been a
conquering race or a hereditary aristocracy --and aristocracies have usually been, at least in theory,
descendants of conquering races. I think Nietzsche would accept this definition. "No morality is
possible without good birth," he tells us. He says that the noble caste is always at first barbarian,
but that every elevation of Man is due to aristocratic society.
It is not clear whether Nietzsche regards the superiority of the aristocrat as congenital or as due to
education and environment. If the latter, it is difficult to defend the exclusion of others from
advantages for which, ex hypothesi, they are equally qualified. I shall therefore assume that he
regards conquering aristocracies and their descendants as biologically superior to their subjects, as
men are superior to domestic animals, though in a lesser degree.
What shall we mean by "biologically superior"? We shall mean when interpreting Nietzsche, that
individuals of the superior race and their descendants are more likely to be "noble" in Nietzsche's
sense: they will have more strength of will, more courage, more impulse towards power, less
sympathy, less fear, and less gentleness.
We can now state Nietzsche's ethic. I think what follows is a fair analysis of it:
Victors in war, and their descendants, are usually biologically superior to the vanquished. It is
therefore desirable that they should hold all the power, and should manage affairs exclusively in
their own interests.
There is here still the word "desirable" to be considered. What is "desirable" in Nietzsche's
philosophy? From the outsider's point of view, what Nietzsche calls "desirable" is what Nietzsche
desires. With this interpretation, Nietzsche's doctrine might be stated more simply and honestly in
the one sentence: "I wish I had lived in the Athens of Pericles or the Florence of the Medici." But
this is not a philosophy; it is a biographical fact about a certain individual. The word "desirable" is
not synonymous with "desired by me"; it has some claim, however shadowy, to legislative
universality. A theist may say that what is desirable is what God desires, but Nietzsche cannot say
this.