dustrial State. This, I think, is both true and important. I think, however, that Marx is wrong in
two respects. First, the social circumstances of which account must be taken are quite as much
political as economic; they have to do with power, of which wealth is only one form. Second,
social causation largely ceases to apply as soon as a problem becomes detailed and technical. The
first of these objections I have set forth in my book Power, and I shall therefore say no more about
it. The second more intimately concerns the history of philosophy, and I will give some examples
of its scope.
Take, first, the problem of universals. This problem was first discussed by Plato, then by Aristotle,
by the Schoolmen, by the British empiricists, and by the most modern logicians. It would be
absurd to deny that bias has influenced the opinions of philosophers on this question. Plato was
influenced by Parmenides and Orphism; he wanted an eternal world, and could not believe in the
ultimate reality of the temporal flux. Aristotle was more empirical, and had no dislike of the
every-day world. Thorough-going empiricists in modern times have a bias which is the opposite of
Plato's: they find the thought of a super-sensible world unpleasant, and are willing to go to great
lengths to avoid having to believe in it. But these opposing kinds of bias are perennial, and have
only a somewhat remote connection with the social system. It is said that love of the eternal is
characteristic of a leisure class, which lives on the labour of others. I doubt if this is true. Epictetus
and Spinoza were not gentlemen of leisure. It might be urged, on the contrary, that the conception
of heaven as a place where nothing is done is that of weary toilers who want nothing but rest.
Such argumentation can be carried on indefinitely, and leads nowhere.
On the other hand, when we come to the detail of the controversy about universals, we find that
each side can invent arguments which the other side will admit to be valid. Some of Aristotle's
criticisms of Plato on this question have been almost universally accepted. In quite recent times,
although no decision has been reached, a new technique has been developed, and many incidental
problems have been solved. It is not irrational to hope that, before very long, a definitive
agreement may be reached by logicians on this question.
Take, as a second example, the ontological argument. This, as we have seen, was invented by
Anselm, rejected by Thomas Aquinas,