not know, I am certainly not believing truly about his none; whereas, if I decide to believe that that
is his name, there is a chance that I may be believing truly. The sceptic, says James, is afraid of
being duped, and through his fear may lose important truth; "what proof is there," he adds, "that
dupery through hope is so much worse than dupery through fear?" It would seem to follow that, if
I have been hoping for years to meet a man called Ebenezer Wilkes Smith, positive as opposed to
negative veracity should prompt me to believe that this is the name of every stranger I meet, until I
acquire conclusive evidence to the contrary.
"But," you will say, "the instance is absurd, for, though you do not know the stranger's name, you
do know that a very small percentage of mankind are called Ebenezer Wilkes Smith. You are
therefore not in that state of complete ignorance that is presupposed in your freedom of choice."
Now strange to say, James, throughout his essay, never mentions probability, and yet there is
almost always some discoverable consideration of probability in regard to any question. Let it be
conceded (though no orthodox believer would concede it) that there is no evidence either for or
against any of the religions of the world. Suppose you are a Chinese, brought into contact with
Confucianism, Buddhism, and Christianity. You are precluded by the laws of logic from
supposing that each of the three is true. Let us suppose that Buddhism and Christianity each has an
even chance, then, given that both cannot be true, one of them must be, and therefore
Confucianism must be false. If all three are to have equal chances, each must be more likely to be
false than true. In this sort of way James's principle collapses as soon as we are allowed to bring in
considerations of probability.
It is curious that, in spite of being an eminent phychologist, James allowed himself at this point a
singular crudity. He spoke as if the only alternatives were complete belief or complete disbelief,
ignoring all shades of doubt. Suppose, for instance, I am looking for a book in my shelves. I think,
"It may be in this shelf," and I proceed to look; but I do not think, "It is in this shelf" until I see it.
We habitually act upon hypotheses, but not precisely as we act upon what we consider certainties;
for when we act upon an hypothesis we keep our eyes open for fresh evidence.
The precept of veracity, it seems to me, is not such as James thinks.