The Foundations of Buddhism

The Abhidharma 221

dharmas, by the practice of the path. Critics of the Sarvastivadins

objected that if 'possession' is a dharma like other dharmas

then it must require 'possession' in order to operate: there would

have to be possession of 'possession' of 'possession' and so on,

ad infinitum. The Sarvastivadins responded with the notion of a

'secondary possession' (anupriipti) that both possessed and was

in turn possessed by the primary possession.

For certain Buddhist theorists the intellectual sophistica-

tion, not to say abstraction, of the Sarvastivadin analyses rendered

them problematic. Among the critics of the Sarvastivada a group

styled the Sautrantikas or 'those who follow the method of the

sutras' are especially important for the subsequent history of

Buddhist thought. Although the Sautrantikas did not accept

the Abhidharma as the 'word of the Buddha', it would be wrong

to think of them as rejecting the Abhidharma method in its

entirety. In fact the basic Abhidharma system is largely assumed

by their criticisms; it is particular doctrines characteristic of the

Vaibha~ika-Sarvastivada Abhidharma that they took issue with.

Two theories are especially associated with their name: the the-

ory of the radical momentariness of dharmas and the theory

of seeds.

Rejecting the idea of dharmas existing in the three times of

present, past, and future, Sautrantikas criticized the Sarvastivadin

conception of the duration of a dharma in the present moment.

For the Sarvastivadins dharmas are substantial realities (dravya),

existing in their own right, which for a moment operate in the
present. From this perspective, the present moment although a
very short period of time, is none the less a period of time. There
is no Sarvastivadin consensus on the length of a moment but figures
given in the texts work out at between o. 13 and 13 milliseconds.^18
Yet, object the Sautrantikas, if something endures unchanged
for even a moment, then the fundamental Buddhist principle of
impermanence is compromised. If things are truly impermanent,
then they must be changing continuously and cannot remain
static for any period of time, however short.^19 This kind of think-
ing led to the conception of moments as point instants of time

which, just as geometric points have no extension in space, have