The Mahayana 249
how we construct our world our of ideas, of how this causes us
suffering, and of how we can turn this process around and escape
from suffering. In other words, like all Buddhism it presents us
with an account of the four truths. Yogacara denies the ultimate
independent existence of a separate experiencing subject on the
one hand and another separate world 'out there' of experienced
objects. ·That the world appears like this is an illusion con-
structed out of consciousness; or mind. But this is not to be taken
as saying that I, the experiencing subject, somehow exist as my
mind, my consciousness, while the external world of objects does
not exist. It is precisely both that are ultimately fictions, illusions-
' ideas' ( vijflapti) fabricated by mind. True, Yogacara privileges
'mind' or 'consciousness' in so far as it is the operation of the
mind that brings about the illusion of the duality of subject and
object. But 'mind' that is not an experiencer or enjoyer of ex-
ternal objects is not exactly mind as we ordinarily understand
it. For Y ogacara, as for all Buddhist thought, it is the way things
are rather than what actually is, that is crucial: the truth under-
lying reality is 'thusness' (tathatii).
In many ways Y ogacara represents the culmination of the north
Indian Buddhist intellectual tradition. Its treatises set forth a full
psychological theory (which represents a reworking of earlier
Abhidharma systems), a complete map of the path (outlining in
some detail the progress of calm and insight meditation), and a
complex understanding of the nature of buddhahood. As with
all Buddhist thought, one should not be misled by the philosoph-
ical sophistication of Madhyamaka and Yogacara thought. Their
teachings are not seen as mere intellectual abstraction which to
all practical intents and purposes we can forget about. The the-
oretical content of these systems are as ever orientated towards
·releasing beings from suffering. For Madhyamaka, as long as
we see a world of things that exist in themselves, we are trying,
however subtly, to hold on to things that ultimately must slip
from our grasp, and this can only cause ourselves and others suf-
fering. Likewise, for Y ogacara, as long as we see the world in
terms of really existent experiencing subjects and really existing
