enforcing religious freedom in indonesia 129
sense, the Ahmadiyah controversy in Indonesia is part of a wider debate
on secularism and the state – normal in any democracy – and should
not merely be seen in terms of ‘religious radicals’ targeting minority
groups. Sadly, however, the Ahmadiyah controversy in Indonesia is also
an excellent example of how democratisation can become a victim of its
own success. This is the case for more than one reason. Without access to
a wide range of print and online publications susceptible to their ideas,
religious hardliners would never have been able to set the terms of the
debate on Ahmadiyah to the extent they have done since at least the
2005 mui fatwa on the matter. The objections against Ahmadiyah beliefs
that are mentioned in the mui fatwas are used time and again by most
people who have publicly aired their views on the matter: Ahmadiyah
claims that its founder Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is a prophet, so the sect is
deviant because there is no prophet after Muhammad. Standing up for a
group like Ahmadiyah, which even mainstream Muslim organisations
and political parties at the national level see as clearly having crossed the
line, is politically not very attractive.
Thus, there is a large degree of consensus on who is to blame in the
Ahmadiyah controversy, but when talking about solutions the issue
becomes a lot more complicated. Some say Ahmadis are the problem
and thus hold the key to the solution. Others argue that the state should
interfere – with some saying it should do so for religious reasons and
others highlighting civil rights. The form of proposed state intervention
varies, too. There are those who maintain that the state should outlaw
Ahmadiyah and there are those who instead want the government
apparatus to protect all citizens, including Ahmadis. Whereas civil society
activists – from the traditionalist, modernist and tarbiyah camps – all
stressed the need for continued dialogue, lawmakers – not entirely
unexpectedly – advocated a legal solution. Representatives from the
liberal and the conservative camps within traditionalist Muslim politics,
former Commission viii chairman Abdul Kadir Karding (pkb) and
Religious Affairs Minister Suryadharma Ali (ppp) respectively, have both
stated their support for a legal solution to settle the Ahmadiyah dispute
once and for all.
For organisations like the nu and Muhammadiyah, it is important
to note that although they are not officially political in outlook, their
decisions – or lack thereof – do have a political impact.
When we look at Muslim leaders’ reactions to the Cikeusik incident,
any assumed schism between Indonesia’s modernists and traditionalists is
not that clear. In fact, the major line of division when we look at the variety
of approaches to the Ahmadiyah controversy is not between modernists
and traditionalists, but between civil society groups and politicians.