24 islam, politics and change
One of the reasons for the weak election performance of Islamic polit-
ical parties is that they do not have a monopoly on Islam. Labelling their
rivals, Golkar, pdi-p (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan/Indone-
sian Democratic Party-Struggle) and Partai Demokrat, ‘secular parties’
or using the term ‘secular voters’ fails to appreciate the role of Islam
in politics in general. Already during the New Order politicians and
office holders, including President Suharto himself, rushed to Islamic
institutions and gatherings to increase their popularity. Organisational
ties were also developed. During the New Order Golkar established
links with traditional and modernist Muslims via a number of organisa-
tions of which the guppi (Gabungan Usaha Pembaharuan Pendidikan
Islam/Joint Effort to Modernize Islamic Education) and an association
of former members of the hmi (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam/Islamic
Student Association) are the best known, while in August 2007 the pdi-p
launched its Islamic wing, Baitul Muslimin (House of Muslims). At times
the secular pdi-p even appears to be an Islamic party. At the close of
the New Order, protestors supporting the pdi-p suspended their street
protests to pray, while Sukarno’s daughter, Megawati, the party’s popular
leader, initially appeared on party posters with her hair uncovered, but
was later depicted wearing a headscarf.
A second factor contributing to the poor election results of the
Islamic political parties is that they and the organisations they turn
to for mobilising support are complex entities. Within one and the
same party or organisation members have different, even mutually
exclusive, opinions about what an Islamic society should look like
and what reaching it involves; disputes amongst the leaders can be
frequent and bitter. Adding to this is a built-in source of conflict: the
presence of religious advisory boards and fatwa councils, institutions
that clash with their executive boards, one of the most important points
of friction being the primacy of religious considerations over political
ones. This certainly comes to the fore in Permata’s in-depth analysis
of the rivalries within the pks and the socio-religious organisation
affiliated with it, the Jemaah Tarbiyah, and between the two. The pks
is a proper choice because it is an Islamist party which, together with
the Jemaah Tarbiyah, strives for and identifies itself with the promotion
of a drastic Islamisation of Indonesian society. Yet the delicate internal
relationships described in Permata’s report are also very present in the
other Islamic parties and socio-religious organisations. It also underscores
that in the relation between political party and affiliated organisation,
the latter may be or intends to be a moral compass, something that also
comes to the fore in Bastiaan Scherpen’s report about reactions to the
Ahmadiyah persecution in which he touches upon the relations between