systems. To achieve that goal the authors have recourse to a vast array of tra-
ditionally recognized exegetical principles, which can only be briefly illustrated
here. When two smr.titexts are contradictory, it is possible to invoke for one of
them the concept ofkalivarjya “a practice to be avoided in the kaliyuga.” Thus,
when Manu first recognizes levirate as a valid form of marriage (9.59) and,
immediately thereafter, rejects it as being dharma fit for cattle (9.65–6), the com-
mentators avoid the contradiction by arguing that levirate marriage was allowed
in earlier world eras, but that it should not be practiced in the wretched kaliyuga.
The texts often compare dharma with a cow, which in the kr.ta-orsatyayuga
stands on four feet, on three feet in the treta ̄yuga, on two in the dva ̄parayuga, and
on one foot in the kaliyuga. Or, when a smr.titext includes a number of items in
a list, the commentator is at liberty to interpret the list either as comprehensive
or as merely illustrative. Thus, when Gautama (10.39 =2.1.39) enumerates five
ways of acquiring property (inheritance, purchase, partition, seizure, and dis-
covery), commentators who, for reasons of their own, wish to recognize the fact
of being born as a means of acquiring a right of ownership in the joint family
property, argue that Gautama’s list is illustrative. Others, who claim that the
head of the family is the sole owner of the entire joint family property, in their
turn argue that Gautama’s list ought to be taken literally. The often intricate
arguments which the commentators proffer in defense of their interpretation of
thesmr.titexts – not unlike other branches of Sanskrit commentarial literature,
the commentaries and nibandhason the dharmas ́a ̄stras often take the form of dia-
logues between named or unnamed opponents and the authors – are grounded
in their vast knowledge of other scholarly disciplines, including the different
systems of Sanskrit grammar, the principles of textual exegesis elaborated in the
Mı ̄ma ̄m.sa ̄su ̄trasand their commentaries, the rules of logic (nya ̄ya), etc. (For a
detailed analysis of the various devices used by the commentators to interpret
thedharmas ́a ̄stras, see Lingat 1973: 143–75.)
TheDharmas ́a ̄strasin Modern Times
In 1772, in an effort to prevent Indians being subjected to English law, which
was totally foreign to them, the Governor (later Governor-General) of Bengal,
Warren Hastings, encouraged a decree to the effect that “in matters of inheri-
tance, marriage and other religious matters, the Gentoos shall be governed by
the laws of the Shaster, the Muhammadans by the law of the Koran.” In other
words, from 1772 onward “the Shaster,” i.e. the ancient dharmas ́a ̄stras– rather,
the entire, undefined body of Sanskrit dharmas ́a ̄stra literature – were elevated en
bloc to the rank of law books to be used by the Anglo-Indian courts of law to
decide civil and religious disputes among Hindus.
Many British servants of the East India Company were familiar with Persian
or even Arabic, and applying the law of the Koran to Indian Muslims was not
expected to present major problems. Sanskrit, on the other hand, was totally
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