Nya ̄yasu ̄tra1.1.1 makes a further demand on the type of proof procedure
admissible in a critical inquiry. It insists that the inquirer be able explicitly to set
out for others the piece of knowledge so acquired as the conclusion of a precisely
formulated demonstration (avayava). In its general schematic form, a demon-
stration scheme has five steps:
i) Preliminary statement of the thesis to be proved.
ii) Citation of a reason.
iii) Invoking an example.
iv) Application to the present case.
v) Assertion with confidence of the conclusion.
For example: (i) There is a fire on the mountain. (ii) Because there is smoke there.
(iii) As in the kitchen. (iv) The mountain is the same. (v) Therefore, there is fire
there. I will look in detail at the structure of such argument schemes in a later
section (1.7). I am interested here in what the demand for demonstration tells
us about the nature of critical inquiry, an investigation “with reasons.” The early
Nya ̄ya writers want to explicate the notion of a reason. Since the rational way
to achieve one’s goals is by acquiring knowledge about its constituents, it might
seem that a reason is any method of acquiring knowledge (prama ̄n.a). However,
the insistence now is that the rational inquirer be able to set out his reasoning
in an explicit and canonical way. And a “reason” is the premise or evidence (hetu)
in such a suitably formulated argument. Va ̄tsya ̄yana explains that the various
means of acquiring knowledge have a subsidiary role here. They enter the
account as the means by which each step in the explicitly formulated demon-
stration is proven:^12
The means of acquiring knowledge reside in those [demonstration steps]. The pre-
liminary statement of the thesis is an item of testimony (a ̄gama). The reason (hetu)
is an item of inference. The example is an item of perception. The application is an
item of “analogical comparison.” The final conclusion exhibits the possibility of all
these coming together in a single thesis. Such is a nya ̄ya par excellence. With the
help of this alone can truth-directed, victory-directed and destructive debate tech-
niques be employed, never otherwise. Fixing the truth depends on this. The steps
in the demonstration are sentences, and as such are included among the objects
of knowledge; but they are mentioned separately for the above reasons.Va ̄tsya ̄yana’s systematizing idea is that the three strands out of which the Nya ̄ya
system is formed – theory of knowledge, study of critical inquiry and art of
debate – can be brought together into a single discipline. In doing so, he intro-
duces a new condition on a rational inquiry: that it be capable of being made
public through verbal demonstration. A rational inquiry is, to be sure, a proce-
dure for reaching one’s goal which exploits knowledge about that goal and the
most effective way to achieve it. But it must also be knowledge of the sort that
can be displayed. It must be knowledge that is backed up by reasons of the sort
that are potentially capable of convincing others, something that can stand up
to the scrutiny of a debate.
418 jonardon ganeri