of actions not performed” is a reference to the karma theory of moral retribu-
tion. If the soul and the mind were distinct consciousnesses, then the future
contentments or frustrations of the soul would depend on the present deeds of
another, the mind. This contradicts the fundamental principle of the karma
theory, that the benefits and costs of one’s present actions accrue to oneself and
not to someone else. Va ̄tsya ̄yana uses the same line of reasoning against the
Buddhist reduction of a person to a “sum and series” of consciousness-moments
(NS 3.2.39). If a person is a series of distinct consciousnesses, then the deeds of
one reach their fruition in the contentments and frustrations of another, an
injustice incompatible with the hypothesis ofkarma.
The more important assertion is that the mind is “ruled by another.” It does
not act independently, but only as directed by the conscious soul. It therefore
cannot itself choose which sense to connect with. How then can the soul be
unaware of its operation? A solution to the puzzle begins to emerge when we
remember that the mind has another function, along with that of intersensory
switch. It is also an inner sense, the means by which the soul perceives its own
mental states. Va ̄tsya ̄yana:^22
Memory, inference, testimony, doubt, intuition, dreams, suppositional argument,
and perception of pleasure and pain are the proof of mind.One conclusion we can draw from this is that the soul is not immediately aware
of its own thoughts, for it requires an inner sense to perceive them. Thoughts,
just like external events, can appear and disappear unperceived. So the mere fact
that a thought occurs does not imply that it is taken notice of in consciousness.
Once the point has been made that the mere occurrence of a thought is not suf-
ficient for its being noticed, we see that the switching function of the mind need
not determine which thoughts are noticed, but need only ensure that thoughts
occur in succession. We can think of the mind as scanning the senses, constantly
switching from one to the next. Its movement so conceived will be very swift, but
entirely automatic and mechanical. Perceptions from all the senses occur
rapidly, but sequentially in the soul.
To attend to something then, is not to direct the mind quaintersensory switch
towards one rather than another sense faculty, but rather to direct it quainner
sense to some occurrent perception. The rapid movement of the mind need not
be something of which the soul is aware. There is still a problem. If a perception
comes before consciousness only if one chooses to direct the mind towards it,
how can it be that one’s attention is sometimes drawn by the perception itself?
Standing on a thorn or a chip of stone will draw the attention even of a person
whose mind is fastened on some other thing (NBh. under NS 3.2.32). The worry
is that I will not notice the pain in my foot unless I direct my mind to attend to
the deliverances of my tactile sense, but that there need be no motivation for me
to do this in advance of noticing the pain. Unless it occurs to me to check
whether my foot has been injured, I will not notice the pain! Even this, however,
can be squared with a mechanistic conception of the mind. Let us say simply
hinduism and the proper work of reason 427