with, any doctrinal base (NS 1.2.1). A reason property which proves a thesis
contradictory to a doctrinal base is a mere bogus reason (NS 1.2.6). Reason in
Nya ̄ya has had its wings clipped. It can override neither observation nor author-
itative doctrine!
Descartes observed that our perceptions can sometimes contradict one
another, and that when they do it is the role of reason to adjudicate. A tower
might look round from a distance, but square closer up. A star and a distant lamp
both look like specks of light, but one is vastly larger than the other. It is reason
(belief and inference) that tells us that the star is larger than the lamp, even
though they both look the same size. It is reason that allows us to decide whether
the tower is really square or round. How, then, can one deny that reason some-
times overrides perception? However, there are cases where perception overrides
reason. Va ̄tsya ̄yana tries to find a case where a reasoned argument meets all the
criteria as laid down in the theory of inference, but whose conclusion has to be
rejected because it goes against perception. His example is: fire is not hot, because
it is a creation, like a pot. Fires and pots are alike in that they are both products
of human effort (let us restrict the extension of “fire” to those produced by
humans). A pot, however, is a thing made of clay and so is not hot (material
things are composed out of the four material elements, earth, water, fire, and
air, and only those containing elemental fire are hot). So fire too is not hot! The
inference goes through even if we insist on a universal connection between
reason and target. For it is indeed true that, among everything seen, created
things are not hot. The point is that the inference extrapolates from the seen to
the unseen, and fire’s heat therefore belongs here with the unseen. The thermal
properties of fire, as the matter under investigation, are, as it were, sub judice.
Every created thing ever encountered (excluding fire) has been found to be cold.
So, extrapolating fire too as a created thing must be cold. Uddyotakara says that
the inference is baffled by a perception of fire.
The conflict here is between a prediction based on an inductive generalization
and an actual observation. In general, one faces a choice whenever one has both
an inference to the truth of some conclusion and strong evidence that the con-
clusion is false. One can either reject the evidence for the falsity of the conclu-
sion, or else reject one of the premises in the inference. The examples of
Descartes are cases where the first option is the correct one to choose. The evi-
dence of the senses is defeated in one case by its own internal inconsistency and
in the other by a generalization with enormous empirical support (that things
look smaller when they are further away). But the example of Va ̄tsya ̄yana is a
case where the second option is the correct one. In the face of incontrovertible
observation, one must reject the similarity metric on the basis of which the
extrapolation was made.
When is it rational to reject the premise, when the conclusion? Is this not a
question for reason itself to decide, and when it decides in favor of the conclu-
sion (i.e. of perception) does it not therefore decide to override itself? It is to avoid
the apparent absurdity of such a result that the Nya ̄ya insist on there being two
different models or faculties of reason: reason as the rational extrapolator, and
440 jonardon ganeri