basket and concentrated on an ostensibly Vajpayee-led reasonableness and a
noncommunal plan of action.
The second success of the BJP, this time as part of a stable coalition, appeared
to confirm the view that Hindu nationalism could not hope to change the Indian
polity, because of the nature of Indian politics. Indian political exigencies would
broadly remain the same regardless of specific ideological agenda. The con-
straints of economic liberalization – to respond to globalization through
deregulation, open markets, hard negotiation in bi- and multi-lateral forums –
seemed, by the turn of the century, to be inescapable.
Geopolitical constraints too seemed to make a mockery of ideology. The tense
relationship with Pakistan over Kashmir focused attention on this matter. From
Independence, Kashmir had been a contested area. A state under British rule,
its Hindu ruler had acceded to India despite its Muslim majority. Although the
newly formed Pakistan failed in its attempt to annex Kashmir, a part of Kashmir
stayed under Pakistan after a cease-fire. A plebiscite was supposed to have been
held but never was. The situation by the late 1980s was roughly this: India main-
tained that Kashmir – including, nominally, that part in Pakistan – was an inte-
gral part of the secular Indian Union, the special constitutional provisions made
for it being held adequate to its special status. Pakistan claimed that as a Muslim-
majority state, Kashmir would more naturally be part of Islamic Pakistan, and
that any plebiscite held would lead to this end. Meanwhile, Pakistan would be
morally committed to any attempt by Kashmiri Muslims to break away from
India. As Indian mismanagement of Kashmir led to the alienation of a large
section of the population, the spread of Islamic fundamentalist ideology, and
training, especially through Afghanistan, reached Kashmir via Pakistan. As
various militant groups took to fighting the Indian army, the political situation
settled into this dead-end equation: India would not talk about any change to
Kashmir without the cessation of civil unrest, sustained, it seemed from the evi-
dence, through Pakistani support for Kashmiri Islamic militancy. Pakistan
refused to acknowledge that it overtly supported the militants but argued that
India had to face the reality of a natural Islamic coincidence of interest between
Kashmir and Pakistan. As for the militants, most followed Pakistan’s line while
claiming still to be fighting for outright independence (the end seemingly sup-
ported by a substantial portion of Kashmiri Muslims).
In this context, Hindu nationalists always argued for complete Indian control
over Kashmir and an utter refusal to concede anything to either Pakistan or the
militants. In government, the BJP found itself acting somewhat differently. First,
Vajpayee initiated a confidence-building process with the Prime Minister of
Pakistan; but this came to nothing. Worse, for mysterious reasons, Pakistan
undertook a risky incursion into India, in cooperation with Kashmiri militants.
The BJP-led government braved domestic anger with a highly restrained and
defensive military policy that ruled out counter-incursion and incurred higher
Indian casualties than a more aggressive tactic might have permitted. Immedi-
ate international support for Indian policy resulted and the mini-war came to
an end without clear result but with Pakistan compromised on the international
546 c. ram-prasad