in order to achieve group goals, such as the building of irrigation systems
or defense in war. Familiar modern examples of power from below include
the election of club or team of¿ cials or captains. When we think of power
as “legitimate” (e.g., the right to tax in a democratic society), we are
generally thinking of it as power from below, even if it is backed by the
threat of force.
“Power from above” depends on the capacity to make credible threats of
coercion. That depends on the existence of disciplined groups of coercers,
loyal to the leader and able to enforce the leader’s will by force when
necessary. In such an environment, people obey because they will be
punished if they do not. This aspect of power highlights the coercive (or
“parasitic”) element in power relationships. The existence of jails, police, and
armies is evidence that such power exists. Yet no state can depend entirely
on coercion because maintaining an apparatus of coercion is costly and
depends on maintaining the willing support of the coercers. No individual
can single-handedly coerce millions of others. In practice, the two forms of
power are intertwined in complex ways. “Protection rackets,” for example,
offer a service. Yet it is often the racket itself that is the likely source of
danger, so does the payment of “protection money” count as a form of power
from below or above? Building coercive groups is complex and costly, and
the earliest forms of power emerged before such groups existed. That is why
the ¿ rst power elites depended mainly on power from below.
This lecture has discussed the nature of institutionalized power to help us
explain how it ¿ rst emerged in human history. The next lecture will ask how
this analysis of power can help us understand the simple forms of power that
emerged during the early Agrarian era. Ŷ
Christian, Maps of Time, chap. 9.
Fagan, People of the Earth, chap. 14.
Essential Reading