thought of a negative theology of the totally Other to which both Horkheimer
and Adorno have granted a right within their critical theory of society and
religion.
Morality
For the critical theory of religion, such theology is the foundation of all moral-
ity, particularly in Western civilization. Based on this dialectical understand-
ing of a negative theology of the totally Other, Jürgen Habermas (1993a:134)
is correct in stating that the essential trait of Horkheimer ’s critical theory of
religion is morality. The longing that the murderer will not ultimately tri-
umph over the innocent victims is the foundation of morality in both its ratio-
nal and, as stated above, “non-scientific” form. According to Horkheimer,
this non-reified, non-fetishized, materialistic longing for that which is totally
Other than the socially created barbarity and horror of existence was the orig-
inal understanding of theology and morality in both Judaism and Christianity.
As examples of this theology and morality, Horkheimer (1985:432) looked
to the Jewish and Christian martyrs – to those who have given themselves
completely in the service of humanity’s emancipation from all forms of
exploitation and domination as they professed the totally Other. However,
Horkheimer differentiates between the Jewish and Christian martyrs based
on their theological motivation. The martyrs of Christianity – who resisted
the power of the status quo in the hope of the totally Other – endured their
torture more easily due to their belief that their suffering was only a brief
stage before they personally entered paradise. Jewish martyrs, however, believe
something completely different. Theirs was not the issue of a personal reward
in heaven but that they would live on in the memory of the faithful. They
sacrificed themselves not for personal salvation but for the welfare of the
people. In Judaism, the particular subject does not play as large a role as it
does in Christianity. In the Pentateuch of the Jewish scriptures, the word
“you” applies to both the individual and to the whole people as subject, of
which the individual is a part. The subject’s identity and autonomy is bound
up dialectically with the solidarity in and of the community. In Judaism, this
relationship cannot be separated or differentiated clearly. Horkheimer illus-
trated this point through the work of one of his doctoral students who retrans-
lated the Jewish moral law, which is also the second part of Christianity’s
“greatest commandment” – “You shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus
The Notion of the Totally “Other” • 145