they argue that even modernity’s celebrated concept of reason remains inter-
twined with myth and irrational presuppositions. In their view, the con-
frontation between modernity and religion is anything but resolved. For
Adorno suggests that, when the pursuit of scientific truth is split off from the
idea of true society, the facts and logic of social science can themselves become
“hypostatised” and even mythological (1976a:26–7).
Such a perspective on religion and modern society stands in rather dra-
matic contrast with the contemporary application of rational choice theory
in the study of religion. This essay illustrates this difference through a com-
parison of the critical social theory of Adorno and Horkheimer with rational
choice explanatory models of religious practice as developed by two differ-
ent scholars: Rodney Stark and Lawrence Iannaccone. Both of these theorists
display assumptions similar to those criticized by Adorno and Horkheimer
in their methodological writings. The extent to which this is true will be illus-
trated by drawing from a popular depiction of the presuppositions of ratio-
nal choice theory, in the form of a scene from the Academy Award winning
film A Beautiful Mind(2001). This analysis will show that, rather than assist-
ing the study of religion to escape from theological and metaphysical assump-
tions, rational choice theory is itself laden with problematic presuppositions.
It is more a repetition of what Hegel calls the “beautiful soul” than it is the
achievement of a “beautiful mind.”
The Scientific Study of Religion and Rational Choice Theory
Prior to turning to rational choice theory, it is useful to place the intentions
of its application to the study of religion in context. The social scientific study
of religion has long been a scene of considerable methodological dispute. The
discipline emerged in the nineteenth century out of theological schools and
faculties, and has often been criticized for harbouring theological or meta-
physical assumptions.^1 Although “religious studies” scholars generally dis-
tance themselves from confessional doctrines and commitments, they have
sometimes been accused of defending essentialist and universal theories of
religion, thereby seeming to suggest a trans-cultural relevance for religious
experience and discourse.^2 Intertwined in these debates are the even more
152 • Christopher Craig Brittain
(^1) For a historical sketch of these issues, see: Preus 1987.
(^2) For examples of prominent scholars in the field often criticized for such a posi-