that, “Religious economies are like commercial economies in that they con-
sist of a market of current and potential customers, a set of firms seeking to
serve that market, and the religious ‘product lines’ offered by the various
firms” (1997a:16–17). This view is employed to support his challenge to the
secularization thesis: “to the degree that a religious economy is competitive
and pluralistic, overall levels of religious participation will tend to be high.”
In other words, as the “monopoly” of mainline Christian churches declines,
the emerging pluralistic and “free” religious market will result in increasing
“religious” activity and exchange, as individual “religious investors” diver-
sify what Lawrence Iannaccone calls their “religious portfolios” (1995:81). It
is suggested that, in a “free market,” flexible institutions will prosper.
There are numerous problems with this approach to religion, but two will
be highlighted in particular: its reliance upon the concept of “compensators,”
and its roots in “supply-side” economic theory.
Steve Bruce argues that the notion of compensator is rather “slippery.”
Referring not only to something a person is willing to expend costs on, but
also to a promised future reward, as well as an explanation of how that reward
will be received, the concept becomes circular as the term shifts from one
meaning to another (Bruce 1999:32). It is difficult to see how an explanation
will necessarily substitute for an immediate reward. A compensator is, in fact,
not a reward at all – only a substitution for one. Yet Stark, but also Iannacconne,
often treat these deferred-rewards as concrete “products” delivered by the reli-
gious “firm.” Surely a step is omitted in this analysis, however, for the reli-
gious “compensator” can only function as such when an individual is somehow
convinced that what is on offer can substitute for an immediate reward. This
process of how and why certain concepts or practices are able to function in
this way remains largely unexamined in the theory of compensators.
Furthermore, why should the scholar of religion conclude that accepting
the promise of a better life after death, in the face of a life of suffering, rep-
resents a “rational choice”? Again, it is instructive to refer to A Beautiful Mind.
As the Nash-character sits in the bar, he might decide that he should avoid
the blond woman he truly desires, and accept the “compensation” of what-
ever other woman accepts his attention. Conceivably, he might also be inspired
by a sign on the wall that reads “good things come to those who wait.” There
are many possible courses of action available to him. The question is, why
should a social theorist label a decision to accept the compensation of a generic
“woman,” or of the sentimental cliché on the wall, “rational” behavior? Why
162 • Christopher Craig Brittain