the linguistification of the sacred, the translation of spell-binding norms into
discourses that respect autonomy and the constitution of the world through
language, marks a transition from mythic to modern forms of thought, what
he calls the move toward postmetaphysical thinking (Habermas 1987:77–111).
This transition emerges out of the encounter with pluralism and the decen-
tering of religious authority and tradition in favor of communicatively gen-
erated norms (norms that are chosen rather than dictated). According to
Habermas, in modernity religion no longer holds cognitive or authoritative
sway within rationalized communities. However, insofar as the translation
of religious language into secular discourses has not occurred, religious lan-
guage will retain an affective power for those belonging to a religious com-
munity and yield a kernel of incomprehensibility to those who do not share
in the praxis driven collective representations.
Although Habermas is a relentless defender of cultural, philosophical, and
political modernity, he notes that the defiant “syndrome of validity” that
adheres to undifferentiated mythical and religious worldviews manifest in
the form of religious language and can be understood as the bearer of a
semantic content that is inspiring and, perhaps, indispensable (Habermas
1992:17, 51). In other words, religion continues to inspire and provide nor-
mative guidance despite its general displacement by rational discourses.
Habermas maintains that since religious forms of identity lay claim to a tran-
scendence that forestalls the “entropy of meaning” that is “necessarily banal-
ized in political communication,” religious identity-formation can serve as a
kind of nourishment for the rejuvenation of the lifeworld threatened with
disintegration and dissolution by rationalizing discourses (Habermas 1996:490).
Considered in this light, religious language can be seen to mediate between
impersonal processes of rationalization, however welcomed by participants,
and social fragmentation via the emptying out of traditional values on the
way toward a postconventional identity.
In terms of the schema outlined by Walter, this revivification of religion –
not as an authoritative and proscribed tradition, but as the encouragement
to develop a personal religious narrative – is constitutive of postmodernism.
While Habermas notes that religion is a preservative against the collapse of
meaning that rides in tandem with rationalization, he does not, unlike the
postmodern approach, collapse the division between public discourse and
private forms of expression along the way. I suggest that Habermas’s con-
ception of religious language has an advantage over a framework which
192 • Kenneth G. MacKendrick