In this chapter we focus in particular on speaking in tongues, praise and
prophecy as local orders of practice. Following Garfinkel’s ([1948]2005) argu-
ment that action only has meaning if it achieves a recognizable order, we
look for the ways in which the religious rituals we observed were made
orderly and recognizable by participants (pastors and worshipers) for one
another, as an ongoing matter, and not as a process of interpretation in a
context of belief. In so doing, we treat actions that were incongruous – or
problematic – to participants, as clues to the order properties of ordinary
taken-for-granted action. Actions sanctioned as inappropriate demonstrate
that beliefs and motives are not enough. It is necessary for participants to
produce a recognizable form of practice.
In an attempt to access the constitutive details of recognizable and appro-
priate practice in the churches we studied, our analysis focuses on four cases
of tongues, praise and prophecy (expressions of the Holy Spirit) which were
treated as inappropriate by the congregations and their pastors. Through an
analysis of these failed practices we attempt to elucidate the orders of detail
that constitute recognizable and appropriate practices in each situation. When
practices do not achieve a recognizable form, beliefs and motives are ques-
tioned and the participant sanctioned. In showing what does not count, such
sanctions allow the researcher to observe and record the details of what does.
Recognizability is a key aspect of appropriateness. Practices must be rec-
ognizable in their details – as what is expected – before other parishioners
can recognizethem as appropriate expressions of belief in particular religious
contexts. Participants only trust one another, and accept one another ’s actions
as authentic, to the extent that they are able to produce practices that are rec-
ognizable as the expected and acceptable ones for “just this” local congre-
gational situation. Trust – even in this religious and faith relevant context –
is not based on beliefs, but on the ability to demonstrate competence in, and
commitment to, the local orders of practice in which the others are also
engaged.
In taking up the relationship between beliefs and practice we elaborate on
an old difference between Weber and Durkheim over the relative importance
of beliefs and practices. While Weber emphasized interpretive contexts of
belief, Durkheim argued that practices come first, both as a logical and a his-
torical matter, and that not understanding this had led, among other things,
to ethnocentricism and the idea that western religions were superior because
of their beliefs (Durkheim 1912; Rawls 2005). When beliefs are treated as the
essence of religion, non-western religions that focus on practices and do not
250 • Bonnie Wright and Anne Warfield Rawls