monotheism was subjected to change under the impact of Sufism which
catered for the emotional and orgiastic needs of the masses. In consequence,
Islam was pulled in two opposite directions by these two groups. The war-
rior group pulled Islam in the direction of a militaristic ethic; and the Sufis
in that of mystical flight. Both the directions of Islam, representing, as it
were, a bifurcated Islamic ethic failed to produce, as Weber will have us
believe, the prerequisites congruent with the rise of rational capitalism.
Moreover, despite the legacies of the Greco-Roman civilization, its advanced
sciences, medicine and philosophy, rationality remained limited to virtuosos
encapsulated within its centers of learning. Thus, Islamic theology was little
transformed by either internal contradictions or challenges from without.
Despite the sophistication of Muslim science, philosophy and medicine, there
did not emerge a class that would either challenge religious orthodoxy or
embrace rationality and in turn foster a Muslim Reformation. While beliefs
and practices may well vary by time and region, like most legitimations of
traditional authority, Islam has often stood as a barrier to the purposive ratio-
nality that is an essential moment of modernity. This was as evident in it pat-
rimonialism that stunted the move to rational administration as much as the
absence of asceticism as a moment of inner determination seen in “salvation
anxiety” that in turn impelled work, not to seek wealth, but confirm salvation.
But let us at the same time note that the religiously-based ideological bar-
riers are typically materially-based and often used and fostered by certain
groups to sustain their own powers. The contemporary political classes (mostly
autocratic dictatorships), as well as clerics and theologians, typically on State
payrolls, generally do not want an open, critical press, genuine grassroots
democracy and open debates that might redress grievances or challenge their
power. Nor do they wish to open their economies to genuine competition
that might undermine local businesses, read reduce corruption. Few of these
countries can be said to have a truly representative government, grass root
political organizations, or a free, uncensored press.^11 As a result, much of the
From the Caliphate to the Shaheedim• 299
(^11) Lebanon has a much more open press, for example, Dar Al Hayat, compared to
the tightly controlled press of Iran that routinely closes dissenting newspapers. Further,
the emergence of Al Jazeera, the television network, provides information more open
than typical of Middle Eastern news sources. It is also worth noting that compara-
tively speaking the Middle East has fewer NGOs than other areas of the world.
Prodemocracy NGOs are typically harrassed. On the other hand, the explosion of the
Internet has become a means of creating open, democratic spaces where free com-
munication is possible.