VIOLENCE IN THE STATE OF EXCEPTIONfor example, points to similarities between the secular concept of the state of exception
and the theological concept of the miracle.^34 His claim actually consists in two separate
arguments: he argues, on the one hand, that ‘‘all the central concepts of the modern
doctrine of state’’ are in fact secularized theological concepts, and, on the other, that a
‘‘structural analogy’’ exists between theological and legal concepts.^35 Schmitt thus empha-
sizes both a genealogical and a systematic affinity between the state of exception and the
miracle, without, however, claiming that these concepts are positively identical.^36
According to Schmitt, theological expressions, images, and metaphors continue to
haunt a secularized juridico-political discourse. Thus theology is not completely absent
from the legal sphere, but neither can it be described in directly theological terms.
Schmitt’s argument that the sovereign ‘‘decision is, considered normatively, born out of
nothing’’ should be read against this background.^37 On the one hand, Schmitt implicitly
aims at an analogy between the legal concept of the decision and the theological concept
of thecreatio ex nihilo, the divine creation ‘‘out of nothing.’’ On the other hand, he
consciously avoids the use of explicitly theological terms. In Schmitt’s eyes, a positive
identification of both concepts—the legal decision and the theologicalcreatio—would
only amount to the formation of quasi-theological myths. Far from being identical to the
creatio ex nihilo—that is, a pure original creation—the sovereign decision remains violent
and impure. By understanding the decision in light of thecreatio—not claiming an iden-
tity, but focusing on an analogy—Schmitt attempts to dramatize responsibility, stressing
the possibility of radical violence in the case of failure.
Benjamin’s Critique of Violence
In ‘‘Critique of Violence,’’ Benjamin, like Schmitt, examines the relationship between law
and violence in the light of theology. By exposing the legal order’s dependence on violent
‘‘lawmaking’’ decisions, Benjamin likewise attempts to articulate a certain kind of respon-
sibility, which he understands theologically. Benjamin begins by suggesting that the exist-
ing critiques of violence are entangled in a conceptual confusion concerning both the
violence to be criticized and the violence inherent in critique itself. A critique that under-
stands violence to be merely a means to effect the norms of either positive or natural law
will not be able to get a hold on state violence, for that critique will focus on the ille-
gitimacy or illegality of a juridical practice instead of grasping violence ‘‘as a principle.’’
That critique, moreover, tends to mobilize violence as itself a means, that is, as a ‘‘means
of pressure,’’ and thus risks becoming implicated in the very violence it seeks to criticize.
Benjamin suggests that the critique of violence can only be effective if it succeeds in
overcoming this conceptual confusion: neither the violence to be criticized nor
the violence inherent in critique itself is merely a means. It is not a means, but a
‘‘manifestation.’’^38
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