TOLERATION WITHOUT TOLERANCE
have the potential to elude strict control. But the conclusion Locke draws from this does
not account for this elusiveness. To the contrary, with the doctrine of empiricism as his
reference point, Locke maintains that the human mind, upon careful examination, is free
to distinguish between what is essential and what is inessential to the happiness of every-
body. It is this freedom—a freedom independent of the bodily dispositions that empower
it—that makes it possible to reduce or increase pain and suffering at the behest of the
person who encounters them. Locke explains about the relationship between free will,
agency, and examination of the body: ‘‘Examination isconsulting a guide. The determina-
tion of thewillupon enquiry isfollowing the direction of that Guide: And he that has a
power to act, or not to act according as such determination directs, is afree Agent.’’^15
This account of the relationship between self-examination, agency, and free will de-
fines Locke’s contribution to the contemporary model of reasonable toleration. The con-
tribution is an image of reason as a disembodied faculty of cognition that, without being
involved in day-to-day dealings, is capable of deciding the extent to which difference of
opinion matters to the pursuit of happiness. This implies an instrumental stance with
regard to the construction of knowledge, a stance that supports the development of what
Charles Taylor calls ‘‘the punctual self.’’^16 Locke also more directly influences the way in
which contemporary theorists approach the issues of tolerance and toleration. First, it
follows from his analysis that the duty to tolerate wrong does not extend to things that
touch upon substantial truths of morality or religion. This point is the implicit upshot of
the notion of things indifferent, and it shows that to be tolerant depends upon knowing
when not to be tolerant. Second, it follows that the raison d’eˆtre of toleration is the
pursuit of happiness, understood as the opposite of pain and suffering. This puts the issue
oftolerationin opposition totolerancebecause the latter includes the attitude or sensibility
that makes it possible to endure pain and suffering. Thus, we may conclude that Locke
takes us to a crossroad: either we disconnect the two issues—tolerance and toleration—or
we rethink the ontological imaginary of reason empowering this disconnection.
Three Imperatives of Thought
The stakes at this crossroad are high. On the one hand, it seems ‘‘natural’’ to follow the
route of Locke because it directs us to someone like Kant, who gives the doctrine of
empiricism a transcendental foundation. On the other hand, it seems equally ‘‘natural’’
to replace the Locke-to-Kant route with one that appreciates the intellectual diversity
characterizing the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Enlightenment. Such an alterna-
tive route would take us to a variety of other thinkers, among whom Voltaire might be
the first to come to mind, because he, more than anyone else, was seen as a champion
of the Enlightenment in his own time. That Voltaire no longer has this status is clear from
the way in which contemporary theorists of reasonable toleration interpret his work as an
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