TALAL ASAD(the religion of the ruler is the religion of his subjects). This agreement is part of the
genealogy of secularization in that it attempted to resolveparticular religiousproblems by
adoptinga general politicalprinciple at a time when ‘‘the core of religion’’ was coming to
be seen as an internal matter. Contrary to what is popularly believed, it was not the
modern world that introduced a separation between the religious and the political. A
separation was recognized in medieval Christendom, although of course it meant some-
thing very different from what it means today. For one thing, it articulated complemen-
tary organizing principles. Although in theory distinct, ‘‘temporal power’’ (the monarchy)
and ‘‘spiritual power’’ (the church) together embraced the entire realm through a multi-
plicity of mutually dependent—and sometimes conflicting—personal relations. The
medieval idea of the king’s two bodies (the body natural and the body politic, the one
physical and the other metaphysical) was eventually transfigured.^11 The state became de-
Christianized anddepersonalized: political status (a new abstraction) could be separated
from religious belonging, although that doesn’t mean it was totally unconnected with
religion. The dominance of ‘‘the political’’ meant that ‘‘religion’’ could be excluded from
its domain or absorbed by it. That in turn presupposed a political concern with identify-
ing religion either in its nominal or adjectival forms. The reading of uncontrolled religion
as dangerous passion, dissident identity, or foreign power became part of the nation-
state’s performance of sovereignty. Defining religion’s ‘‘proper place’’ while respecting
‘‘freedom of conscience’’ became both possible and necessary.
Put another way: once the state became an abstract, transcendent power, independent
of both rulers and ruled (as Hobbes famously theorized it), it was possible to argue about
the scope of its national responsibilities toward social life as a whole—the space in which
subjects with different (religious) beliefs and commitments live together. It became natu-
ral forthe state—now seen as an overarching function distinct from the many particular
purposes of social life, and distinct also from the national bureaucrats, parliamentary
representatives, judges, and other officials who carried out that function—to decide not
only who was deserving of (religious) tolerance in that life but what (religious) tolerance
was. And it became possible to think about mobilizing the sentiments ofbothrulers and
ruled in support of the integrity of beliefs that could be obeyed. Signs (emblems) were
needed for the abstract state to represent itself, of course, and beyond that, it needed the
ability to deal with signs that defined what it represented. Signs are important to all
political authority, but especially so to the modern state because of the several domains
that it carves out and the diverse activities it regulates.
In 1589 the Edict of Nantes gave French Protestants the right to practice their religion
in a Catholic realm, at the very time when Spain was on the verge of expelling its Muslim
converts to Christianity. Although the Edict was revoked in 1685, the French Revolution
a century later denounced all ‘‘religious intolerance’’ and attacked the ecclesiastical hierar-
chy in the name of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. The political oratory and pamphle-
teering of the Revolution crystallized a public space that was national in its focus and
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