BETTINA PRATOrights ethics and Judaism acknowledge that the latter is primarily a religion ofmitzvoth,
or obligations, although they argue that rights are the logical correlate of obligations. In
Leibowitz’s view, however, ‘‘Right is a legal term that designates a concept which is inap-
plicable apart from an institutional framework defined in terms of a legal system estab-
lished by men. Its application to natural reality is invalid.’’^24 Moreover, he rejects any
attempt to reconcile Judaism with ethical discourses in general, suggesting that ‘‘religion
and ethics are antagonistic’’ because they stem from utterly different concerns (the one
with obeying the Torah, the other with proper will and intention, molded either by knowl-
edge of truth or by adherence to duty).^25 In relation to human rights ethics, in particular,
Leibowitz claims that there is no basis in Judaism for placing specific value in the human
being, who is nothing but animageof the divine.^26
Against such a view, and in line with a humanistic Jewish tradition that counts among
its members Moses Maimonides (1138–1204) and Saadiah Gaon (882–942), RHR takes
the biblical theme of creationb’tselem (Elohim), ‘‘in the image’’ (of God), as a foundation
for the infinite value of the human person. In so doing, it aligns itself with Jewish human-
ists such Haim Cohn or Lenn Goodman, who argue that human rights are a natural
consequence of man’s being in God’s image, and ‘‘elements of a larger scheme of natural
justice, which situates humanity in creation vis-a`-vis God’s law, as articulated in Scripture
and as implicit in the human frame and condition.’’^27 To some extent, RHR literature
recognizes that the notion ofb’tselemcan ground different understandings of human
personhood, ranging from phenomenological humanism to a reading of human rights
that allows them to be applied in a manner that privileges the rights of Jews, especially
when Jewish lives are at stake.^28 The theoretical position of the group seems to lie some-
where between an undifferentiated humanism and a humanism rooted in the peculiar
calling of the Jewish people, with tones that more or less accentuate the universal or the
Jewish-specific features ofb’tselemdepending on the circumstances.
To the extent that a common group position exists it seems to be close to that of
David Novak, for whomb’tselemdoes not indicate some intrinsic quality of the human
being as such, since, as he points out, ‘‘the problem with seeing the image of God as an
inherent characteristic of human nature is that such a characteristic can be constituted
phenomenologically without reference to God.’’ Rather, that notion marks a continuous
intimacy between man and God, which transpires as ‘‘that which God and humans share
in what they do together.’’ In other words, ‘‘Essential human action, which is the practice
of the commandments, is unlike all other things that are made by the Creator. Rather, it
is done along with the Creator. In rabbinic teaching, even God himself is imagined to
observe the commandments of the Torah in order to share with his people the basic
reality of their active life. Thus the basis of a positive relationship between God and
humans is the human capacity, designated as the image of God, to be able to respond to
God’s commandments with a sense of authentic obligation.’’^29
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