A HOME HAUNTED BY STRANGERSwords: ‘‘The duty to protect and defend the rights of the socially disadvantaged is repeat-
edly emphasized in both biblical and Talmudic texts. The message is clear. We are respon-
sible for ‘the widow, the stranger in our midst and the orphan.’ We are responsible for
the well-being of those who work for us. In these matters the distinction between Jews
and non-Jews is not significant.’’^51 Thus, to Grenimann the stranger has claims upon ‘‘us’’
because of her very defenselessness, which is intrinsic to her ‘‘strangeness’’ and is therefore
(potentially) forever able to call upon us to take responsibility on her behalf. Hence the
presence of the stranger as a powerless person (despite her ability to ‘‘work for us’’)
requires an assumption of responsibility on the part of the Jewish majority in Israel, but
it also enables this majority to affirm its power to speak and act on behalf of others. In
consequence, the existence of the strangeras suchneed not be regarded as problematic,
nor does the Jewish experience of strangeness necessarily demand establishing a situation
of equal citizenship that would enable today’s ‘‘strangers’’ to assume responsibility toward
their Jewish fellow citizens (since the Jews’ own strangeness is past, but also yet to be
redeemed).
While this limited appreciation of the significance of Jewish strangeness in Egypt is
rather common in public RHR pronouncements, in line with the group’s general commit-
ment to the Jewish character of the Israeli state, this need not necessarily result in a sort
of benevolent paternalism, whereby non-Jews in Israel are forever confined to the position
of vulnerable subjects awaiting the caring speech of others. According to Rabbi Benjamin
Hollander, for instance, the presence of strangers within Israel is not just an inevitable
social evil that Jewish Israelis must deal with by taking responsibility for these people’s
well-being. On the contrary, this presence is a key reason for the very creation of a Jewish
state, which was needed ‘‘so that Jews could obey the mitzvah not to oppress the
stranger,’’^52 a commandment mentioned in the Bible no fewer than thirty-six times. In
other words, without such strangers the state would somehow forfeit some of its Jewish
character in the sense of being a space for the realization of biblical commandments.
Moreover, the concrete meaning of ‘‘nonoppression’’ in a contemporary democracy can-
not be interpreted in paternalistic terms, but rather means granting non-Jews all the rights
attached to modern citizenship, on an equal footing with their Jewish fellow citizens.
According to Hollander, the biblical termoppressionmust be understood in light of what
contemporary Western societies consider necessary for the dignity of the human being,
both as an individual and as a member of an ethno-national group, rather than relying
on idiosyncratic interpretations of the mitzvoth by Israeli politicians.
The question of how contemporary Israelis should ‘‘remember’’ being strangers in
Egypt thus appears as an essentially political one rather than one of human rights alone,
as it begs further questions about the concrete contemporary meaning of ‘‘nonoppres-
sion’’ and the distinction between rights of citizenship and human rights. The question
of the relationship between rights of citizenship and human rights is also familiar in
Western political discourse, for instance, in the context of debates about multiculturalism
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