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(C. Jardin) #1
NOTES TO PAGES 445–46

a crucial role in enabling this paper—as, indirectly but fundamentally, has the vibrant legacy of
Edward Said.



  1. This is a space that to a large extent remains non-Muslim. Which is to say, there are diverse,
    fascinating, and extended discussions taking place about the veil among Muslims that will not be
    addressed here because within the West these remain largely relegated to the ‘‘private’’ realm of
    homes, grassroots organizations, Internet sites, mosques, and minority media and have yet to be
    given full and equal access to the public realm. This essay, then, in focusing on the public realm,
    addresses only one part of what is actually a larger discussion—reproducing in this way the very
    exclusion (of Muslim arguments) that I critique. It is, of course, a lesson in how we are shaped by
    our objects of study. At the same time, this essay is the first step in a larger project of opening up
    our spaces of debate to fuller encounters between ‘‘Western’’ and ‘‘Muslim’’ arguments, as well as
    to the recognition that these two positions as often blend with as challenge each other, that the
    Muslim may be Western and the Western Muslim.

  2. As Robert N. Bellah argues in ‘‘Religion and Belief: The Historical Background of ‘Non-
    Belief,’ ’’Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World(New York: Harper & Row,
    1970), 216–29.

  3. While my concern is with the nature of the debate about the veil in Western public space
    as a whole, the most urgent and contested discussions are in fact centered in continental Western
    Europe. English-speaking nations of the West share the same prejudices toward the Islamic veil as
    Western Europe, but this has not generated the same level of distressed debate, political posturing,
    and legislation. I’ll come back to the reasons for this below. For now, I want to recognize that in
    many ways the debate about the veil is in fact more about the nature of (continental Western)
    Europe specifically than about the West in general. Yet precisely the historical slippage between
    ‘‘Europe’’ and the ‘‘West,’’ and the question of the extent to which Europe still can imagine that it
    represents the West as a whole, is one of the most central issues here. In line with this slippage, I
    continue at moments to use the termWestto refer both to the larger collection of nation-states
    tracing their primary descent lines to all of Europe and more specifically to the smaller collection
    of powerful Western European nations that continue to conceive of themselves as representing the
    West as a whole. Most specifically, my locale is the public space of the Netherlands—the West’s first
    modern world power, once the world’s largest ‘‘Muslim’’ empire, and today perhaps the Western
    European nation-state most torn between modernity’s contradictory heritage of tolerant, pragmatic
    humanism and purist, idealist rationalism (a distinction Stephen Toulmin develops beautifully in
    hisCosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity[New York: Free Press, 1990]). This is not an
    argument I can elaborate here, but I might note that the deep complexities and contradictions of
    Pim Fortuyn’s intellectual legacy and political trajectory as an openly gay, reactionary populist, who
    was at once anti-immigration and open about his nights of pleasure with young North African
    men, culminating in his assassination by a radical animal-rights activist, offer one useful starting
    point for thinking about the Netherlands as more ‘‘representative’’ of the West’s crisis-ridden mod-
    ernist project than its tiny size today might suggest.
    In the U.S. context, the veil’s equivalent in terms of affective resonance and political sensitivity
    is perhaps the Spanish language of Latino (im)migrants, likewise read as a synechdochal index of
    an ‘‘alien,’’ nonwhite, Catholic presence. Here too, in the U.S., the likes of Pat Buchanan and
    Samuel Huntington argue that Hispanics, specifically Mexican immigrants, resist linguistic and
    cultural integration and in doing so threaten both the integrity of American national identity and
    the future of the nation-state. Unlike in Europe, however, there exists in the U.S. a much more
    extensive repertoire of counter-narratives and scholarly critiques with which to engage such argu-
    ments. See Samuel Huntington’s recentWho Are We?: The Challenges to America’s National Identity


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