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(C. Jardin) #1
NOTES TO PAGES 608–11


  1. Bernard Stiegler contends, e.g., that conscious reflection first emerged in protohumans
    (millions of years ago) when they began to use stone tools. The stone tool is the first known
    exteriorization of memory and anticipation. Conscious interiorityemerges throughthe incorpora-
    tion of this nonhuman exteriority, articulated in parallel in the material evolution of the brain
    (corticalization). The materiality of the tool functions as an exterior ‘‘archive’’ of its function,
    recalling to consciousness its projected and recollected use, thereby producing the first interioriza-
    tion, the first hollow of reflection, by way of this nonhuman outside (Stiegler,Technics and Time 1:
    The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. George Collins and Richard Beardsworth [Stanford: Stanford Uni-
    versity Press, 1998]). I am grateful to Ben Corson for this point. See his ‘‘Speed and Technicity: A
    Derridean Exploration’’ (Ph.D. dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University, 2000).

  2. This tendency to figure the efficacy of human-nonhuman groupings in passive terms is
    exemplified in the following quotation, which describes the consensus within archaeology: ‘‘all agree
    that agency refers to the intentional choices made by men and women as they take action to realize
    their goals... [But all also insist that] these actors are socially constituted beings... embedded in
    sociocultural and ecological surroundings that both define their goals and constrain their actions’’
    (Elizabeth Brumfield, ‘‘On the Archaeology of Choice,’’ inAgency in Archaeology, ed. Marcia-Anne
    Dobres and John E. Robb [New York: Routledge, 2000], 249). Or, as the sociologist Margaret Archer
    puts it, people are ‘‘both free and enchained, capable of shaping our own future and yet confronted
    by towering... constraints’’ (Archer,Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach[Cam-
    bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995], 65).

  3. The debate over which is more potent, agency or structure, seems to have been settled
    with the view that agentic individuals and constraining social systems are mutually constitutive—as
    per Anthony Giddens’s dialectical notion of structuration or Michel Foucault’s idea of a disciplinary
    power that engenders the individual as a responsible, moral agent. But despite Foucault’s insistence
    upon theproductivepower of collective agency, most social scientists continue to conceive of social
    forces as exercising only apassiveor restraining kind of efficacy—i.e., the power to block or inter-
    rupt the more active agency of purposive individuals.

  4. The extensive literature on actor network theory is usefully summarized at The Actor
    Network Resource, http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/ant.html.

  5. See Bruno Latour,Aramis; or, The Love of Technology(Cambridge: Harvard University
    Press, 1996). See also the elegant account ofAramisin Eric Laurier and Chris Philo, ‘‘X-Morphising:
    Review Essay of Bruno Latour’sAramis; or, The Love of Technology,’’ http://www.geog.gla.ac.uk/elaurier/
    text.

  6. Colin Barron, ed., ‘‘A Strong Distinction Between Humans and Non-humans Is No Longer
    Required for Research Purposes: A Debate Between Bruno Latour and Steve Fuller,’’History of the
    Human Sciences16, no. 2 (2003): 81.

  7. Adorno writes that it is simply not possible to ‘‘unseal’’ a concept (e.g., agency) by dividing
    it neatly into constituent parts; one can only ‘‘circle’’ around it. See Theodor W. Adorno,Negative
    Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1999), 166.

  8. Latour,Politics of Nature, 76.

  9. Jacques Derrida, ‘‘Marx and Sons,’’ inGhostly Demarcations: A Symposium on Jacques
    Derrida’s Specters of Marx, ed. Michael Sprinker (London: Verso, 1999), 248–51. Disappointment is
    absolutely essential to messianicity: the ‘‘promise is given only under the premises of the possible
    retraction of its offering’’ (Werner Hamacher, ‘‘Lingua Amissa: The Messianism of Commodity-
    Language and Derrida’sSpecters of Marx,’’ inGhostly Demarcations, 202).

  10. Derrida, ‘‘Marx and Sons,’’ 253–56.

  11. Bergson,Creative Evolution, 73.


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