(second ed. 1853), II. 193–305; Nitzsch: Dogmengesch. I. 325 sqq.; and Hefele:
Conciliengeschichte (revised ed. 1877) III. 121–313. Also W. Möller. in Herzog2 X. 792–805.
The literature on the case of Honorius see in the next section.
§ 110. The Doctrine of Two Wills in Christ.
The Monotheletic or one-will controversy is a continuation of the Christological contests ofthe post-Nicene age, and closely connected with the Monophysitic controversy.^604
This question had not been decided by the ancient fathers and councils, and passages from
their writings were quoted by both parties. But in the inevitable logic of theological development
it had to be agitated sooner or later, and brought to a conciliar termination.
The controversy had a metaphysical and a practical aspect.
The metaphysical and psychological aspect was the relation of will to nature and to person.
Monotheletism regards the will as an attribute of person, Dyotheletism as an attribute of nature. It
is possible to conceive of an abstract nature without a will; it is difficult to conceive of a rational
human nature without impulse and will; it is impossible to conceive of a human person without a
will. Reason and will go together, and constitute the essence of personality. Two wills cannot
coexist in an ordinary human being. But as the personality of Christ is complex or divine-human,
it may be conceived of as including two consciousnesses and two wills. The Chalcedonian
Christology at all events consistently requires two wills as the necessary complement of two rational
natures; in other words, Dyotheletism is inseparable from Dyophysitism, while Monotheletism is
equally inseparable from Monophysitism, although it acknowledged the Dyophysitism of Chalcedon.
The orthodox doctrine saved the integrity and completeness of Christ’s humanity by asserting his
human will.^605
The practical aspect of the controversy is connected with the nature of the Redeemer and
of redemption, and was most prominent with the leaders. The advocates of Monotheletism were
chiefly concerned to guard the unity of Christ’s person and work. They reasoned that, as Christ is
but one person, he can only have one will; that two wills would necessarily conflict, as in man the
will of the flesh rebels against the Spirit; and that the sinlessness of Christ is best secured by denying
to him a purely human will, which is the root of sin. They made the pre-existing divine will of the
Logos the efficient cause of the incarnation and redemption, and regarded the human nature of
Christ merely as the instrument through which he works and suffers, as the rational soul works
through the organ of the body. Some of them held also that in the perfect state the human will of
(^604) The name Monotheletism is derived fromμόνονandθέλημα, will. The heresy, whether expressive of the teacher or
the doctrine, always gives name to the controversy and the sect which adopts it. The champions of the heretical one-will doctrine
are called (first by John of Damascus).Μονοθεληταί, orΜονοθελη̑ται, Monotheletes, or Monothelites; the orthodox two-will
doctrine is called Dyotheletism (fromδύοθελήματα), and its advocatesΔυοθελη̑ται, Dyothelites. The corresponding doctrines
as to one nature or two natures of the Redeemer are termed Monophysitism and Dyophysitism.
(^605) This benefit, however, was lost by the idea of the impersonality (anhypostasia) of the human nature of Christ, taught
by John of Damascus in his standard exposition of the orthodox Christology. His object was to exclude the idea of a double
personality. But it is impossible to separate reason and will from personality, or to assert the impersonality of Christ’s humanity
without running into docetism. The most which can be admitted is the Enhypostasia, i.e. the incorporation or inclusion of the
human nature of Jesus in the one divine personality of the Logos. The church has never officially committed itself to the doctrine
of the impersonality.