the sensuous and intelligible, and is itself the substance of things.^1458 So all nature is created in
man, and subsists in him,^1459 because the idea of all its parts is implanted in him. The divine thought
is the primary, the human the secondary substance of things.^1460
Paradise is to be interpreted spiritually. Adam is not so much an historical personage as the
human race in its preëxistent condition. Man was never sinless, for sin, as a limitation and defect,
is not accidental or temporal, but original in the creation and nature of man.^1461
c. The union of divinity and created existence, or the Godman. Scotus Erigena shows upon
this point the duality of’ his system. On the one hand he presents Christ as an historical character,
with body, mind, soul, spirit, in short the union of the entire sensible and intellectual qualities of
the creature.^1462 But on the other hand he maintains that the Incarnation was an eternal and necessary
fact,^1463 and that it came about through an ineffable and multiplex theophany in the consciousness
of men and angels.^1464
- The return to God, or the completion of the world in Nature, which creates not and is not
created. a. The return to God according to its pre-temporal idea, or the doctrine of predestination.
There is only one true predestination, viz. to holiness. There is no foreknowledge of the bad. God
has completest unity and simplicity; hence his being is not different from his knowledge and will;
and since he has full liberty, the organization of his nature is free. But this organization is at the
same time to the world law and government, i.e. its predestination; and because God is himself
goodness, the predestination can only be to good. The very character of wickedness,—it is opposed
to God, not substantial in nature, a defect mixed up with the good, transitory, yet essential to the
development of the world,—renders it unreal and therefore not an object of divine knowledge. God
does not know the bad as such, but only as the negation of the good. "God’s knowledge is the
revelation of his essence, one and the same thing with his willing and his creating. As evil cannot
be derived from the divine causality, neither can it be considered as an object of divine
knowledge."^1465 Nor is there any divine predestination or foreknowledge respecting the punishment
of the bad, for this ensues in consequence of their violation of law. They punish themselves.^1466
Hell is in the rebellious will. Predestination is, in brief, the eternal law and the immutable order of
nature, whereby the elect are restored from their ruin and the rejected are shut up in their ruin.^1467
(^1458) "Intellectus omnium est omnia," III.4 (col. 632, 1.3 Fr. bel.). "Intellectus rerum veraciter ipsae res sunt," II. 8 (col.
535).
(^1459) IV. 7 (cols. 762-772), e.g. "In homine omnis creatura substantialiter creata sit."(col. 772).
(^1460) IV. 7 (col. 762-772).
(^1461) IV. 14 (col. 807, 808).
(^1462) "’Corpus quippe,’ inquit, ’et sensum et animam secundum nos habens,’ Christus videlicet, ’et intellectum:’ His enim
veluti quatuor partibus humana natura constituitur." II. 13 (col.
(^1463) V. 25 (col. 912).
(^1464) V. 25 (col. 912).
(^1465) Neander, l.c. III. p. 465.
(^1466) "Nullum peccatum est quod non se ipsum puniat, occulte tamen in hoe vita, aperte vero in altera, quae est futura."
De Divina Praedestinatione, XVI. vi. (col. 4236)
(^1467) "Sicut enim Deus electorum, quos praedestinavit ad gratiam, liberavit voluntatem, eamque caritatis suae affectibus
implevit, ut non solum intra fines aeternae legis gaudeant contineri, sed etiam ipsos transire nec velle, nec posse maxi mum
suae gloriae munus esse non dubitent: ita reproborum, quos praedestinavit ad poenam turpissimam, coercet voluntatem, ut e
contrario, quicquid illis pertinet ad gandium beatae viae, istis vertatur in supplicium miseriae." De div. Praed. XVIII. vii. (col.
434), cf. XVII. i. v.