The Economist - USA (2019-07-20)

42 TheEconomistJuly 20th 2019

1

I

t is anordinary Monday evening in Dres-

den. Around 1,000 people have gathered,

under gunmetal skies and German flags,

for the fortnightly demonstration organ-

ised by Pegida (“Patriotic Europeans

Against the Islamisation of the Occident”).

It is a peculiar blend of the convivial and

the hateful. The crowd laughs and cheers as

speakers rail against immigrants, politi-

cians and the media. Later they march

through the city centre, swapping insults

with balaclava-clad counter-protesters.

There are arrests for violence and Holo-

caust denial. Your correspondent’s at-

tempts to interview participants are foiled

by a ponytailed protester screaming “Lü-

genpresse!” (“Lying press”), a slur with Nazi

overtones revived by Pegida.

Far-right politics has long found a home

in Saxony, the east German state of which

Dresden is the capital. The npd, a neo-Nazi

outfit, had seats in Saxony’s parliament

from 2004 to 2014. But in a state election on

September 1st the Alternative for Germany

(afd), a far-right party, has a chance of com-

ing first. It will also do well in two other

eastern elections: in Brandenburg, on the

same day, and Thuringia, in October. It

polls much better in the states of the old

East Germany than in the (far larger) West.

But that difference has become a source of

division inside the party.

In the past five years the afdhas trans-

formed itself from a tweedy set of Euro-

sceptics worried about euro-zone bail-outs

into a populist-xenophobic outfit in the

vein of Austria’s Freedom Party or the Na-

tional Rally in France. It has proved a suc-

cessful strategy. The party has won seats in

all 16 state parliaments and, amid dismay

over Angela Merkel’s open-door refugee

policy, took third place in the general elec-

tion of 2017, earning 13% of the vote and 94

seats. Yet this success has always rested on

an uneasy coalition of disillusioned con-

servatives, nationalist populists and radi-

cals on the fringes of democracy. Hostility

to Mrs Merkel has helped unite these

tribes. But they are a fractious lot.

In Germany’s east the afdhas acquired a

distinctive voice as it puts down local

roots. Where radical groups like Pegida and

the afdonce sought to prove their mutual

independence, now east German afdstars

such as Björn Höcke, the party’s leader in

Thuringia, make inflammatory speeches at

Pegida demos. Pegida’s marches are much

smaller than at their peak of 2015, when the

group could draw up to 30,000 protesters.

But the hard core that remains is more co-

herent, uniting strands of the radical right,

explains Johannes Filous, co-founder of

Strassengezwitscher, a journalistic group

that monitors Saxony’s far right. Many de-

monstrators in Dresden now proudly wave

the afd flag.

Right turn

Mr Höcke, a race-baiting extremist in the

charismatic strongman mould, sits at the

heart of the Flügel (“Wing”), an ultra-right

grouping inside the afdwhose influence

far outstrips its support, thought to com-

prise perhaps one-third of party members.

Disciplined and hierarchical, it is domi-

nant in east Germany; it is also gaining

strength in the west. That has occasioned

drama in several afdstate associations. In

North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany’s most

populous state, earlier this month most of

the party leadership quit in protest at the

growing influence of the Flügel, which has

left those loyal to Mr Höcke in charge. On

July 10th over 100 afdofficials wrote an

open letter vowing that they would strive

to protect the party from the cult of perso-

Germany’s AfD

Too far

DRESDEN

The Alternative for Germany’s strength in east Germany is hurting it in the west

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