experts strongly advised against it and the
World Bank withdrew funding. The case of
the dam may in fact be particularly instruc-
tive since the management of human popu-
lations in preparation for tiger recovery and
reintroduction - relocations of communities
in preparation for the “rising waters” of the
returning tiger populations - bears a strong
resemblance to the coercive relocations
undertaken for dam and reservoir develop-
ment. The question in this case is “How
much natureis enough?” How large and
how numerous will the reservoirs of biologi-
cal diversity need to be and what services
will they provide for the country as a whole
and for local people who are not removed
from target regions? There are no easy or
obvious answers, but private NGO’s, work-
ing alongside the state, promise to present
some intriguing and troubling suggestions.
Before examining private sector efforts, we
should note that the most ambitious state-
led tiger recovery work to date is happening
at Meihuashan, where six tigers occupy a
new captive breeding and retraining facility.
The 467 hectare facility encompasses a rep-
resentative array of habitat types near the
southern boundary of the reserve, and the
tigers have regular access to outdoor zones
where they are learning to kill mammals,
including captive prey. A deer farm was
established to raise sikadeer as prey during
the training period and to attract tourists. It
is hoped that the tigers will produce at least
ten cubs by 2007, and that this second gen-
eration will learn to hunt by following the
example of their parents. By 2010, by which
time managers hope the tigers will be capa-
ble of bringing down large prey and surviv-
ing in the wild without direct human inter-
vention, the doors of the enclosure will be
opened. The tigers will be released into a
special tiger reserve, projected to be 600
square kilometres in area (nearly three
times larger than the present nature
reserve), and still have continuous access to
the security and food of the enclosure. If
the first reintroductions succeed, additional
tigers will be trained and released in
Meihuashan and perhaps other reserves
(Huang Zhaofeng, personal communication;
State Forestry Administration 2000). In July
of 2001, a female gave birth to three
healthy cubs, and the project manager,
Huang Zhaofeng, reported happily that the
adult tigers had learned to kill live goats
and wild boar piglets.Unfortunately, the population may already
be dangerously inbred; today there over 60
captive tigers in China, but all are thought
to be descended from only six wild-caught
tigers, with most of the genetic material in
the population originating from just two of
the founders. Compounding the difficulties
is an official confidence in technological
fixes to revive nature, and a corresponding
disregard for socio-cultural variables; a new,
and in many ways admirable agenda is
cloaked in an old, familiar technocratic
hubris that has caused disasters in China
before, and may yet again. In 1999, when
asked if Meihuashan villagers had been
notified about the plan to reintroduce the
tigers and whether there would be educa-
tional programs to explain the reintroduc-
tion process, a reserve administrator
responded that there was really no need to
do so: “If there is enough wild prey in the
reserve, there will be no conflicts between
people and tigers. There is really no need
for special programs like this.” In what will
be a 600 square kilometre reserve with
some 10,000 residents, this may not be the
most prudent approach, but the China
Action Plan for Saving the South China
Tigershows that the government may have
an additional surprise for the people of
Meihuashan in the near future, for it calls
for the relocation of 300 families from the
larger tiger reserve area in order to rehabili-
tate tiger habitat.An important question that Chinese officials
do not ask is, whether rapid (and desper-