Beyond Signification: The Co-Evolution of Subject and Semiosis 49
nominal expression, which itself enters into new propositions in its turn, thereby raising the
level of abstraction. It is in these accretions of discourse that are nominalised and instantiated
as abstract expressions that the full potential of the symbolic order, as well as its aporiae,
must be located. Just as Thom‘s new mathematical form has a group of preceding others as its
meaning, just so in language must we retrace our steps into prior discourse in order to find the
original meanings of certain nominal expressions we use.
Thom says that creating a new symbol like this ―promotes a kind of tearing away, with
the establishing of a new semantic field which will be the support of the new actant and so
free the mental movement from the obsessional presences which impede it‖ (1983, p. 276).
Just so with language in general; a new symbol arises which allows the mind to fly free of the
obsessional particulars of its previous moments. But what we have added to this sometimes
fanciful imagery of semiosis without limit is the caution that this freedom requires that we be
able to trace our way back whence we came and to show others the same path, lest we forget
what we mean. The ability or opportunity to do this, however, cannot always be taken for
granted.
2.5. Agency and Subjectivity
The inner limit of the symbolic order has been raised here in two ways, in the pitfalls
inherent in the human power of abstraction, and also in the fact that the iconic and indexical
order of the animal kingdom is by no means abolished in the human leap into abstraction. All
in all this represents a formidable constellation of issues to be understood.
The human subject, in the transition to the symbolic order, has been freed from the
species limitations of other creatures, only to reproduce within its own semiosis the entire
range of indexical relations that regulate those other species, including predation, mating
games, power struggles ( ̳pecking order‘, etc.), competition, deception, as well as the forming
of cultures, alliances and regimes of self-regulation that are characteristic in the animal
kingdom in and across various species, but now all within the single human species. Yet if
there is to be freedom from this pure animality of the spirit then there must be potentials for
this freedom to be found within the symbolic order. If this were not the case then there would
be no powers within the symbolic order that were truly superior to those of the indexical order
that defines zoosemiotics. Our powers of abstraction, despite their aporetic limits, must surely
have some potential for liberation from this spiritual-animal kingdom. Let us then consider
what a specifically human agency may entail and how this relates to semiosis.
The semiotic path, via which the animal kingdom of the spirit, as well as any ethical life
beyond it, may be realised, is characterised here as a triune process of introjectivity,
projectivity and reflectivity (cf. Emirbayer and Mische, 1998, p. 971). To characterise each
briefly: Introjectivity is taken to cover somewhat more than the similar term in
psychoanalysis. It is generally the construction of subjectivity through symbolic means and
the construction of a world of knowledge through dialogue with others; it is part of
autopoiesis. Projectivity is the work of imagination, together with intention, motivation and
purpose. It is the activity of the will and desire in relation to external objects and states of
affairs. Reflectivity involves judgment and practical wisdom. It involves taking stock of what
one is doing, alone or with others, and it involves a consideration of ends and means.