Encyclopedia of Sociology

AMERICAN SOCIETY

encouraged separation of church and state and
religious toleration, which, in turn, favored fur-
ther diversity, voluntarism, evangelism, and relig-
ious innovations. Self-reported religious affilia-
tions in social surveys shows these percentages:
Protestant, 60; Catholic, 25; Jewish, 2; other, 4;
none, 9. These broad categories cover hundreds of
diverse groupings (General Social Surveys 1994).

Changes include growth in membership of
evangelical Protestant denominations (now one-
fifth of the population, Hunter 1997), closer ties
between religious groupings and political activi-
ties, and the rise of many cults and sects. Separa-
tion of church and state was increasingly chal-
lenged in the 1990s, and religious militancy in
politics increased. Nevertheless, national surveys
(1991) showed that the religiously orthodox and
theological progressives were not polarized into
opposing ideological camps across a broad range
of issues—although there were sharp divisions on
some particular issues (Davis and Robinson 1996).

Among industrialized Western countries, the
United States manifests extraordinary high levels
of membership and participation. Thus, although
there has been extensive secularization, both of
public life and of the practices of religious groups
themselves, religious influence remains pervasive
and important (Stark and Bainbridge 1985).

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

The long-term increase in the importance of large-
scale complex formal organizations, salient in the
economy and polity, is evident also in religion,
education, and voluntary special-interest associa-
tions. Other trends include the reduced autonomy
and cohesion of small locality groupings and the
increased importance of special-interest formal
organizations and of mass publics and mass com-
munication. The long-term effects of the satura-
tion of the entire society with advertising, propa-
ganda, assorted information, and diverse and highly
selective world views remain to be ascertained.
Local communities and kinship groupings have
been penetrated more and more by formal, cen-
tralized agencies of control and communication.
(Decreasing localism shows itself in many forms. A
well-known and striking example is the continuous
decrease in the number of public school districts.)

These changes have moved the society as a

whole in the direction of greater interdepend-

ence, centralization, formality, and impersonality.

VALUES AND BELIEFS

Beliefs are conceptions of realities, of how things

are. Values are conceptions of desirability, of how

things should be (Williams 1970, chap. 11). Through

shared experience and social interaction, commu-

nities, classes, ethnic groupings, or whole societies

can come to be characterized by similarities of

values and beliefs.

The weight of the evidence for the United

States is that the most enduring and widespread

value orientations include an emphasis on person-

al achievement (especially in occupational activi-

ty), success, activity and work, stress on moral

principles, humanitarianism, efficiency and practi-

cality, science, technology and rationality, prog-

ress, material comfort, equality, freedom, democ-

racy, worth of individual personality, conformity,

nationalism and patriotism; and, in tension with

most other values, values of group superiority and

racism. Mixed evidence since the 1970s seems to

indicate complex shifts in emphasis among these

orientations—primarily in the direction of success

and comfort, with lessened commitment to more

austere values. Some erosion in the emphasis placed

on work and some lessening in civic trust and

commitment may have occurred.

In contrast to many images projected by the

mass media, national surveys show that most Ameri-

cans still endorse long-standing beliefs and values:

self-reliance, independence, freedom, personal re-

sponsibility, pride in the country and its political

system, voluntary civic action, anti-authoritarian-

ism, and equality within limits (Inkeles 1979; Wil-

liams 1970, chap. 11). And for all their real

disaffections and apprehensions, most Americans

see no other society they prefer: As late as 1971,

surveys in eight countries found that Americans

were less likely than persons in any other country

to wish to live elsewhere (Campbell, Converse, and

Rodgers 1976, pp. 281–285). Americans in nation-

al public opinion surveys (1998) ranked second

among twenty-three countries in pride in the coun-

try and in its specific achievements. Thus, popular

attitudes continue to reflect a perennial satisfac-

tion and positive nationalism (Smith and Jarkko 1998).