COALITIONSpartner. A fragile peace can be maintained if
A>B>C and A=B+C; the BC coalition forms as a
matter of course, creating what is known as a
balance of power. This has been the key configura-
tion in European affairs for the past several centu-
ries. The balance breaks down with any significant
shift in the relative power of the parties; for exam-
ple, if A grows stronger than the BC coalition, it
will be tempted to conquer them. If B becomes
equal to A, an AB coalition may be tempted to
attack and partition C. If C grows stronger and the
triad assumes the form A>B, B=C, B+C>A, the
formation of a BC coalition to overthrow A is
likely. In the eighteenth century, the breakdown of
a balance of power led to war without delay. Under
current conditions, the breakdown of a balance of
power among major industrialized states does not
involve an automatic resort to arms, but in several
regional arenas, such as the Middle East, the old
mechanism is still intact.
Terminal conflicts occur also within nations as
coups, resistance movements, and revolutions. One
common pattern is the urban uprising against a
dictatorial regime, in which the players are the
government, the army, and the populace. If the
army continues to support the government and is
willing to fire on the populace, the uprising fails, as
in China in 1989. If the army sides with the popu-
lace, the government is overthrown, as in Indone-
sia in 1998. Often the issue is undecided until the
moment when the troops confront the demonstra-
tors. At a more fundamental level, successful revo-
lutions require a coalition of formerly separate
factions against the ruling group.
Every organization generates both internal
and boundary coalitions. Internal coalitions are
activated whenever persons or groups of unequal
status interact before witnesses. In general, the
presence of a high-status witness reinforces the
authority of a superior, while the presence of a
low-status witness reduces it; examined in detail,
these catalytic effects are delicate and precise.
Boundary coalitions occur whenever one organi-
zation has permanent relations with another. Their
respective agents must form a coalition with each
other to perform their functions, and that coali-
tion pits them both against their own colleagues,
always with interesting consequences.
In a long-term perspective, the three bodies of
coalition studies, theoretical, experimental, and
observational, have developed unevenly. The theo-
ries are elaborate and elegant. The experimental
studies have explored nearly every possibility sug-
gested by the theories, run down every lead, ma-
nipulated every variable. But in sociology, as dis-
tinct from political science and economics, the
observational studies have scarcely tapped the rich
possibilities suggested by the available theories.
The most important work remains to be done.(SEE ALSO: Decision-Making Theory and Research)REFERENCES
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