Encyclopedia of Sociology

COGNITIVE CONSISTENCY THEORIES

to consistency theories, by making their relevant
cognitions consistent.

Cognitive consistency theories gained tremen-
dous popularity in the social sciences in the 1950s,
and generated hundreds of studies. Toward the
end of the 1960s, however, research interest waned.
In 1968, Abelson and collegues published a mas-
sive handbook, entitled Theories of Cognitive Consis-
tency: A Sourcebook. The book was a thorough
chronicle of cognitive consistency theories, and it
addressed these theories from virtually any angle
the reader could imagine. Ironically, the scholarly
detail in which the editors and authors carefully
described their research seemed to have been the
death knell of cognitive consistency theories. Vir-
tually no research on cognitive consistency theo-
ries took place during the 1970s.

With the end of the 1960s, theories of behav-
ior that centered around motivational and affec-
tive forces (which certainly described cognitive
consistency theories) were ‘‘out of vogue’’ with
researchers. Many point to the simultaneous rise
of social cognition approaches in general, and
attribution theory in particular as helping to divert
interest from cognitive consistency theories. Re-
search on cognitive consistency theories was sup-
planted by more complex (some believed) ‘‘cold
cognition’’ approaches that strictly dealt with how
cognitive processes work together, not accounting
for ‘‘hot’’ forces such as feelings and motivation.

Theories of cognitive consistency theory did
not die, they just went away for a while. Abelson
(1983) noted the reemergence of cognitive consis-
tency theories in the early 1980s with the observa-
tion that authors were beginning to write about
social cognition theories in light of the renewed
interest in the nature of affect (e.g., Fiske 1982;
Hamilton 1981). Toward the end of the 1980s,
researchers began to take a closer look at the
influence of affect on cognitive processes (e.g.,
Forgas 1990; Isen 1987; Schwarz 1990). This change
was precipitated by the development of several
theoretical perspectives concerning the nature and
structure of emotion (e.g., Frijda 1988; Ortony,
Clore, and Collins 1988). In an influential article,
Zanna and Rempel (1988) argued that attitudes
toward different attitude objects may be more or
less determined by affective, rather than cognitive,
sources. Consistency theories were not only back,
they were thriving (Harary 1983).

This chapter will discuss five major theories of

cognitive consistency that have had the most im-

pact on the behavioral sciences. They are (in no

particular order) balance theory (Heider 1946,

1958), strain toward symmetry (Newcomb 1953,

1968b), congruency theory (Osgood and Tannen-

baum 1955), affective-cognitive consistency model

(Rosenberg 1956), and finally, what Eagly and

Chaiken (1993) refer to as the ‘‘jewel in the consis-

tency family crown,’’ (p. 456) cognitive dissonance

theory (Festinger 1957).

BALANCE THEORY

The earliest consistency theory is Heider’s balance

theory (1946, 1958). This approach is concerned

with an individual’s perceptions of the relation-

ships between himself (p) and (typically) two other

elements in a triadic structure. In Heider’s formu-

lation, the other elements are often another per-

son (o) and another object (e.g., an issue, object, a

value). The attitudes in the structure are designat-

ed as either positive or negative. The goal of

assessing the structure of a triad is to ascertain

whether the relationships (attitudes) between the

actors and the other elements are balanced, or

consistent. According to Heider (1958), a bal-

anced triad occurs when all the relationships are

positive, or two are negative and one is positive

(i.e., two people have a negative attitude toward an

issue, but they like each other), and the elements

in the triad fit together with no stress. Imbalance

occurs when these outcomes are not achieved (i.e.,

all three relationships are negative, or you have a

negative attitude toward an issue that your friend

favors). Heider assumed that people prefer bal-

anced states to imbalanced ones, because imbal-

ance results in tension and feelings of unpleasant-

ness. Balance, according to Heider, is rewarding.

Interestingly, imbalanced states can also be

rewarding and exciting. Heider said that some-

times balance can be ‘‘boring’’ and that ‘‘The

tension produced by unbalanced situations often

has a pleasing effect on our thinking and aesthetic

feelings’’ (1958, p. 180). In other words, imbalance

stimulates us to think further, to solve the prob-

lem, to imagine, and to understand the mystery of

the imbalance. According to balance theory, there

are three ways to restore balance to an imbalanced

triad: (1) one may change one’s attitude toward

either the object or the other person, in order to