COLLECTIVE BEHAVIORaction from the general to the specific. There is a
jump from extremely high levels of generality to
specific, concrete situations, without attention to
the intervening components and their levels of
specificity. Thus, in Smelser’s view, collective be-
havior is intrinsically irrational.
In order for collective behavior to occur, six
conditions must be met, each of which is necessary
but insufficient without the others. Smelser likens
the relationship among the six determinants to the
value-added process in economics, with each add-
ing an essential component to the finished prod-
uct. The first determinant is structural conduciveness,
meaning that the social structure is organized in a
way that makes the particular pattern of action
feasible. The second determinant is structural strain,
consisting of ambiguities, deprivations, conflicts,
and discrepancies experienced by particular popu-
lation segments. Third (and central in Smelser’s
theorizing), is the growth and spread of a general-
ized belief that identifies and characterizes the sup-
posed source of strain and specifies appropriate
responses. The generalized belief incorporates the
short-circuiting of the components of action that is
a distinctive feature of collective behavior. Fourth
are precipitating factors, usually a dramatic event or
series of events that give the generalized belief
concrete and immediate substance and provide a
concrete setting toward which collective action
can be directed. The fifth determinant is mobiliza-
tion of participants for action, in which leadership
behavior is critical. The final determinant is the
operation of social control. Controls may serve to
minimize conduciveness and strain, thus prevent-
ing the occurrence of an episode of collective
behavior, or they may come into action only after
collective behavior has begun to materialize, ei-
ther dampening or intensifying the action by the
way controls are applied. These determinants need
not occur in any particular order.
Addressing a more limited range of phenome-
na, David Waddington, Karen Jones, and Chas
Critcher (1989) have formulated a flashpoint mod-
el to explain public disorders that bears some
resemblance to the value-added component of
Smelser’s theory. Public disorders typically begin
when some ostensibly trivial incident becomes a
flashpoint. The flashpoint model is a theory of the
conditions that give a minor incident grave signifi-
cance. Explanatory conditions exist at six levels. At
the structural level are conflicts inherent in materi-
al and ideological differences between social groups
that are not easily resolvable within the existing
social structure, meaning especially the state. At
the political/ideological level, dissenting groups are
unable to express their dissent through estab-
lished channels, and their declared ends and means
are considered illegitimate. At the cultural level,
the existence of groups with incompatible defini-
tions of the situation, appropriate behavior, or
legitimate rights can lead to conflict. At the contex-
tual level, a history of past conflicts between a
dissenting group and police or other authorities
enhances the likelihood that a minor incident will
become a flashpoint. At the situational level, imme-
diate spatial and social conditions can make public
control and effective negotiation difficult. Finally,
at the interactional level, the dynamics of interac-
tion between police and protesters, as influenced
by meanings derived from the other five levels,
ultimately determine whether there will or will not
be public disorder and how severe it will be. Unlike
Smelser, Waddington and associates make no as-
sumption that all levels of determinants must be
operative. Also, they make no explicit assumption
that disorderly behavior is irrational, though their
goal is to formulate public policy that will mini-
mize the incidence of public disorders.Resource mobilization theories have been ad-
vanced as alternatives to Smelser’s value-added
theory and to most microlevel theories. Although
they have generally been formulated to explain
social movements and usually disavow continuity
between social movements and elementary collec-
tive behavior, they have some obvious implications
for most forms of collective behavior. There are
now several versions of resource mobilization theo-
ry, but certain core assumptions can be identified.
Resource mobilization theorists are critical of pri-
or collective behavior and social movement theo-
ries for placing too much emphasis on ‘‘structural
strain,’’ social unrest, or grievances; on ‘‘general-
ized beliefs,’’ values, ideologies, or ideas of any
kind; and on grass-roots spontaneity in accounting
for the development and characteristics of collec-
tive behavior. They assume that there is always
sufficient grievance and unrest in society to serve
as the basis for collective protest (McCarthy and
Zald 1977), and that the ideas and beliefs exploited
in protest are readily available in the culture
(Oberschall 1973). They see collective protest as